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1.

INTRODUCTION

The legitimacy of one of the most important and ascendant international institutions, the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), is
not yet firmly established. Although the WTO has achieved significant institutional maturity and sophistication and is widely
admired by international trade specialists, among non-trade specialists the organization is often misunderstood and sometimes reviled.' An organization like the WTO expects its decisions to be
criticized, but when critics question the WTO's actions they often
also question the WTO's right to exercise authority. In the face of
the intense public debate and scrutiny to which it is subjected, the

* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. The author thanks Michael Baron, J.D. 2003, Case Western University, for his excellent
research assistance. The author also thanks Kal Raustiala and Hiram Chodosh for
helpful comments.
1 The street demonstrations that marred the WTO's Ministerial Conference in
Seattle in 1999, quickly spread to meetings of other international economic institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and G-8. See generally William Finnegan, After
Seattle, NEW YORKER, Apr. 17, 2000, at 40 (studying how the spirit of the Seattle
protest gained momentum); THE WTO AFTER SEATTLE Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000)
(analyzing the problems and challenges facing the trading system after the Seattle
ministerial). Those protests, although muted after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks, are now mirrored by the same kind of fundamental resistance on the
World Wide Web to the work of the WTO. Among the websites that comment
critically on international trade policy are: http://www.tradeobservatory
.org/pages/home.cfm; http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/; http://www
.globalpolicy.org; and http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/qatar/.
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WTO has yet to find, or project, a focus of legitimacy that grounds
its authority to act in widely shared values.
Given the WTO's legitimacy problem, analysts and public officials have advanced a vision for the WTO that emphasizes the
WTO's role in helping member countries overcome the special,
protectionist interests that lead governments to create trade barriers. This vision is often advanced to support the organic legitimacy of the WTO on the ground that it advances values of constitutionalism, 2 sovereignty, and democracy. I refer to this as the
inward-looking and economic vision of the WTO, for it focuses on
the role of the WTO in helping member countries address internal
political failures in order to improve their internal economies. By
attempting to combine economic claims with the universal and appealing values of concepts like democracy and sovereignty, proponents of this vision seek to persuade skeptics that the WTO advances both efficiency and also a broad range of political values.
Although the economic theory underlying this vision is widely
accepted, the vision is flawed as a legitimizing or constitutional vision of the WTO and therefore cannot support broad acceptance of
the WTO. This constitutional vision is built on unacceptable assumptions about political processes and the role of economic
analysis in national economic policymaking. It also presents a
flawed understanding of the role of international institutions. Finally, this vision undermines public support for the WTO.

2 The term "constitutional" has no fixed meaning in the context of
international law.
See generally, JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE (1998) (discussing the strengths
and limitations of the WTO and how it will adapt to new demands, including
constitutional structure); ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1991)
(analyzing the GATT, IMF, and World Bank rules and procedures from a
constitutional perspective); Deborah Z. Cass, The 'Constitutionalizaton' of
International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional
Development in International Trade, 12 EURO. J. INT'L L. 39 (2001) (speculating on the
nature of international trade and the valency of the idea of constitutionalization);
Markus Krajewski, Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of lATO
Law, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 167 (2001) (arguing that WTO law cannot serve
constitutional functions); J.H.H. Weiler & Joel P. Trachtman, European
Constitutionalism and Its Discontents, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 354 (1997) (arguing
that the reformation of constitutionalization reflects the reformation of
international law). I will use the term "constitutional" to mean a set of
institutional arrangements and constraints that allocate lawmaking and decisionmaking power among institutions and individuals.
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In its place, I offer an alternative vision of the constitutional
role of the WTO that, while consistent with the economic role of
the WTO, gives us a stronger sense of the true democratic nature of
the WTO-one that can sustain broad support for the WTO, even
among non-trade specialists. This vision understands the WTO as
overseeing international political processes through which states
can seek to influence the policies of other states when they find
those policies to be harmful. I call this vision the external, participatory vision because it focuses on the role of the WTO in helping
member countries address concerns raised by policy decisions in
other countries. This vision is, I claim, consistent with pluralistic
policymaking and theories of democratic decision-making. It is
also consistent with international political theory and an accurate
understanding of the role of international institutions. Moreover,
it presents a portrait of the WTO that appeals to shared democratic
ideals and thus supports the long-term viability and institutional
development of the WTO.
The competition between these two visions could not be more
important for our understanding of the future of globalization. Although the two visions are consistent in their understanding of
economic theory, and of what the WTO does and how it does it,
the two visions are vastly different in their political and institutional portraits of the WTO, and thus in their ability to support the
legitimacy of the WTO among a broad range of civil society.
The WTO has assumed a place of preeminence among international economic institutions, and in some respects among all international institutions, in part because of its pervasive reach and in
part because it has a near monopoly on effective means of resolving disputes and enforcing treaty commitments. 3 The increasing
public visibility of the WTO-and the controversy that surrounds
it- attests to the importance of the WTO as an international institution that creates important frameworks within which economic
and social arrangements between countries are developed. As it
engages other international institutions and its critics among civil
society, the WTO must project a vision that will gain wide acceptance - even among its critics - if its important work is to flourish.
A firm vision of the basis of its own claim to exercise authority
is important to the WTO and its members as well. The Doha Min-

3

See sources cited infra note 23.
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isterial Conference in November 2001,4 which launched the Doha
Development Round of Negotiations, appears to have overcome
the WTO's growing pains, including the "stain of Seattle."5 But the
schisms that divide the members of the WTO and the debates that
challenge the relationship between the WTO, other international
institutions, and civil society have not decreased; they have simply
been given new structure. As the Doha Development Round proceeds, and as the WTO and its members continue to shape the organization, they need a strong foundational understanding of their
role and function. Without such an understanding, the WTO may
miss opportunities or stumble into counterproductive actions.
Even beyond the implications for the WTO, the contesting visions discussed here raise important questions about our understanding of concepts of democracy in an era of globalization. Because economic markets and social and cultural systems transcend
national borders, we are faced with a mismatch between the general unit of governance-the nation-state -and the subjects of that

governance. The general unit of governance must respect territory;
the subjects of that governance and the phenomena being regulated-markets, communications, and information -need

not. In

light of this mismatch, how are we to understand our need to retain control over our lives-the essence of the democratic concept-while addressing transnational phenomenon? How are we
to understand sovereignty in an interconnected world? Our appraisal of the legitimacy of the WTO is emblematic of our search
for new forms of international governance that respect individual
autonomy while addressing transnational phenomenon. The
search for the WTO's legitimacy is emblematic of our search for effective institutions for global governance.
The next Section of the Article discusses the legitimacy of international institutions and articulates how constitutional and de-

4 The results of the Doha Ministerial Conference are discussed generally in
two recent symposia: Reflections on the T/TO Ministerial Conference, 17 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 905 (2002) and Quick Impressions of the Doha Results, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 191
(2002). The Ministerial Conference meets at least every two years. There have
been four such conferences since the WTO was established: Singapore (Dec. 9-13,
1996), Geneva (May 18-20, 1998), Seattle (Nov. 30-Dec. 3, 1999), and Doha (Nov.
9-13, 2001). The Ministerial Conferences are described on the WTO Website, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/minisLe/minist e. htm.
5 U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick, Address to the National Foreign Trade Council (July 26, 2001) (as prepared for delivery) at 8, at
http://www.ustr.gov/speech_test/zoellick/zoellick7.PDF.
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mocratic values can support that legitimacy and lead to wide support for international institutions. This Section presents the basic
theory of democratic values that underlies the WTO vision that I
endorse. Section 3 of the Article explains the two visions of the
WTO in greater detail. After first describing the principle features
of the WTO lawmaking regime, I outline the two contesting, constitutional visions of the WTO, noting that the WTO lawmaking regime can be seen as consistent with either vision.
Section 4 of the Article then assesses the two visions of the
WTO against concepts of democracy, federalism and sovereignty
in order to evaluate their claims to support the legitimacy of the
WTO. This Section concludes that the internal, economic vision of
the WTO is based on a misunderstanding of the role of efficiency
values in democratic policymaking, a mistaken interpretation of
federalism concepts and the jurisprudence of the dormant Commerce Clause, and a misconstruction of the concept of sovereignty.
Conversely, Section 4 also shows that the external, participatory vision is consistent with principles of federalism, the jurisprudence
of the dormant Commerce Clause and concepts of effective sovereignty.
Section 5 of the Article then shows how the external, participatory vision of the WTO-and only that vision-is consistent with
the content and interpretation of the treaties that the WTO administers, lending further credence to the conclusion that the external,
participatory vision in fact animates the WTO regime. Finally, Section 6 shows why the external, participatory vision of the WTO can
command broad respect for the WTO, even among those who do
not share a transcendent commitment to values of efficiency, and
why the WTO provides important ways by which principles of
democracy can be advanced in an age of globalization. This Section elaborates on the challenges to democratic theory that arise
when policy in one country impinges on the lives of people in another country, and why the WTO is a healthy antidote to help address those problems of democratic participation.

2.

THE LEGITIMACY DEFICIT

Consider the importance of the legitimacy of an institution like
the WTO. Legitimacy 6 is the ability of an institution to command

6 The term "legitimacy" is notoriously difficult to define because it may exist
only in the eye of the beholder. Edmund, King Lear's illegitimate son, passion-
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respect for the authority it exercises. 7 It is the ability of an institution to influence the behavior of states and private persons such
that even critics who disagree with the way the authority is exercised nonetheless accept the right of the institution to exercise its
authority. Legitimacy is essential to the effectiveness of the institution; it induces compliance with, and support for, the institution's
authority and affects the ability of the institution to influence personal behavior, ideas, and norms. It is also essential to avoid both
attempts to undercut the institution's authority and attempts to set
up counter-institutions. It thus plays "an important role in [the]
long-term success" 8 of an institution. "[T ] he more an institution is
perceived as legitimate, the more stable and effective it is likely to
be." 9
Skepticism about the legitimacy of international institutions
like the WTO comes from various versions of the theory of the
"democratic deficit" inherent in international institutions. Global
and transnational governance moves the sources of decisionmaking further away from popular control, and therefore further
away from participatory, democratic decision-making 0 that is per-

ately expresses the political nature of legitimacy. After noting that he was not less
worthy, nor less loved, then his legitimate brother, Edmund says:
Well then, Legitimate Edgar,
I must have your land, our father's love is to the bastard Edmund
As to the legitimate. Fine word, "legitimate"!
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR, Act 1, Sc. 2, 11.15-18 (Folger Library 1993).
7 See generally Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of InternationalGovernance: A
Coming Challengefor InternationalEnvironmental Law? 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596 (1999)
(discussing legitimacy of international decision-making in an era of globalization).
The next several paragraphs draw heavily on Bodansky's framework. See also THE
LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001) [hereinafter THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS]
(suggesting that developments due to globalization indicate that the time has
come to take a fresh look at the philosophy of international organization).
8 Bodansky, supra note 7, at 603 (citing 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
31 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968)). Similarly, Joseph Weiler has identified "social legitimacy" as the "broad, empirically determined, societal acceptance of the system." J.H.H. WEILER, The Transformation of Europe, in THE
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "Do THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?" AND OTHER
ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 80 (1999).
9 Bodansky, supranote 7, at 603.
10 Globalization is therefore just an extension of "the problem noted by Rousseau long ago, namely that, as the scale of government increases, the opportunities for citizen participation decrease." Bodansky, supra note 7, at 615 (citing
Robert A. Dahl, A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness Versus Citizen Participa-
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ceived to be such an important source of legitimacy. This aspect of
the global "democratic deficit" is well documented and its ramifications are well explored in the literature."

In the face of questions raised by the WTO's "democratic deficit," several sources of legitimacy for an institution such as the

WTO have been suggested.
Legitimacy might be derived from consent, and the legitimacy
of the WTO is often supported because WTO members have particularly assented to the obligations they have undertaken, including the obligation to be bound when the organs of the WTO's in-

dependent dispute resolution system interpret the WTO treaties.
However, consent is a problematic source of legitimacy for the

WTO. 12 In particular, it does not adequately address critics who
tion, 109 PoL. Sci. Q. 23, 29-39 (1994)). The literature exploring this aspect of the
paradox of global democracy is cited infra in note 11.
11 The debate occurs both with respect to participation in the deliberations of
the various WTO committees, councils, and negotiating groups, and with respect
to participation in the adjudicatory process for interpreting the treaties and settling disputes. See, e.g., Krajewski, supra note 2 (discussing non-governmental
participation in the work of the WTO, greater involvement by national parliaments, and a Parliamentary Assembly for the WTO). Non-governmental participation in the work of the WTO has been widely discussed. See generally Steve
Charnovitz, Participationof Nongovernmental Organizationsin the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 331 (1996) (arguing for increased public participation in the WTO); Daniel C. Esty, Non-Governmental Organizations at the
World Trade Organization:Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L.
123 (1998) (stating that arguments for excluding NGOs are misplaced); Gregory C.
Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and
Politicsof the WTO"s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1 (2001) (analyzing the accountability of the WTO's decision-making powers
regarding environmental policies, and proposing the creation of a World Environment Organization); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and InternationalRelations
Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization,44 DUKE L.J. 829 (1995) (conceptualizing and critiquing three competing models of WTO trade legalism).
12 Consent as a source of legitimacy for the WTO is surveyed in Robert
Howse, The Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization, in THE LEGmMACY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 355 Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds.,
2001). See also Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism,1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 401,
411 (2000) ("In some contemporary international law, such as the WTO, new rules
develop and old rules evolve in unforeseen ways post-ratification."). Consent
seems to be waning in general as a basis for understanding the legitimacy of international organizations. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, AMERIcAN HEGEMONY:
POLITICAL MORALITY IN A ONE-SUPERPOWER WORLD

93 (1994) (emphasizing that

consent to restrictions cannot itself justify continued allegiance to the restrictions
when circumstances or values change); Jose E. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 213 (2002) (relating how international organizations
have altered the structure of treaty making in ways that attenuate notions of consent); Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly:
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fear that when states have consented to delegate some of their sovereign power to the WTO to act in the domain of international
trade, the consent has, in fact, spilled over to a far wider range of
social concerns, such as health and safety issues. Further, many
feel that, even within the trade domain, the consensual delegations
of lawmaking power to the WTO have been too general, amorphous, and uncontrolled to be legitimate under a rationale of consent.' 3
Legitimacy might also be supported by the substantive validity
or effectiveness of the WTO, 14 but that line is also not followed
here. Normative arguments, whether formed in terms of the welfare-producing effects of an organization (measured against some
accepted welfare matrix) or its effectiveness at reaching some goal,
can provide a potent source of legitimacy for an organization. 5
However, substantive legitimacy depends on a settled set of norms
against which to measure the validity and effectiveness of the regime. Where those norms are contested-as they are with respect
Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 191, 208 (2000)
("[Tihe belief that state consent is the exclusive means of legitimizing transnational institutions is anachronistic. It assumes a belief in what we call 'classic sovereignty,' an assumption that is in fact at odds with what most people today actually believe and with numerous areas of international practice."); Phillip R.
Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions, and the Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944,1958-60 (1997).
13 Commentators use the term "ex ante commitment principle" to indicate
that consent is legitimate only if the results are reasonably predictable when the
consent is given. See Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1313 (2001) (discussing, among other
things, the role of "rule of law" as a factor in the legitimacy of constitutional democracy).
14 The substantive legitimacy of the WTO is discussed in Howse, supra note
12, at 363-70. On substantive legitimacy in general, see THOMAS M. FRANCK,
FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995) (discussing the just result
as an element of fairness in international lawmaking). The work of Richard Falk,
a highly regarded expert on global politics, is largely grounded in a well specified
view of appropriate social policy for the global commons, and he measures the
performance of international institutions largely against that view. See RICHARD
FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION 151 (1999) (calling for a "global consensus on
'normative democracy' as the foundation of coherent theory and practice and
waging a struggle for the outlook and orientation of institutions of governance
with respect to the framing of globalization."). See also Peter M. Gerhart, Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory -TRIPS as a Substantive Issue, 32 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L. L. 357, 361, 385 (2000) (arguing that compliance with international law obligations is dependent upon the substantive validity of such obligations).
15 "A normative argument about the legitimacy of the Security Council ...
can employ such normative criteria as fairness, justice, consent, and so forth."
Bodansky, supranote 7, at 602.
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to the WTO-any appeal to normative or substantive legitimacy
begs the issue of whether a particular institution is the appropriate
one for defining the norms in question. The claim of the WTO to
legitimacy in exercising authority over tariffs, for example, does
not-to most people-support its legitimacy in establishing standards for determining the safety of food products. And not all accept that efficiency or economic growth should be as ascendant
values as they appear to be under the WTO regime.
Other than examining legitimacy on grounds of consent or effectiveness, legitimacy can also be supported by invoking principles of cooperative decision-making that themselves attract wide
support, principles underlying concepts such as constitutionalism,
democracy, and sovereignty. While all acknowledge that these
concepts have no unitary, fixed meaning, appeal to the concepts is
a way of supporting the legitimacy of institutions by appealing to
the widely held values these concepts enshrine. Although I discuss
each of these concepts in greater detail later in the Article, we can
understand the values that they encompass in shorthand ways:
constitutionalism as the value of dispersing lawmaking power
among various actors in a way that makes the exercise of power
immune from the passions of the moment; democracy as the ability
to participate (in various forms) in the law as it is made; and sovereignty as the authority to make decisions affecting those subject to
the sovereign power. Institutions that advance those values increase in legitimacy; institutions that diminish those values decrease in legitimacy.
The two constitutional visions of the WTO that I explore here
seek to understand the legitimacy of the WTO by appealing to
these foundational concepts. In my view, however, for the reasons
articulated in this Article, the internal, economic vision is unsuccessful, while the external, participatory vision is successfully
grounded on the kind of principles that will attract wide support.
Underlying my endorsement of the external, participatory vision of the WTO is a view of democratic values that is distinct from
the general literature and that can fruitfully be highlighted before
exploring the concepts of constitutionalism, democracy, and sovereignty in greater detail. This Article recognizes -as few have before-the democratic paradox of globalization. In an interconnected world, the democratic deficit that occurs when decisionmaking is moved further from the people is offset by a democratic
deficit that would occur if we fail to move decision-making authority to higher levels. On the first side of the paradox we have the
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problem of making democratic participation harder by removing
it, for example, from Washington to Geneva; the second side of the
democratic paradox recognizes that when the policy made in one
nation adversely affects people in other nations, those adversely
affected people need to have some meaningful way to participate
in shaping that policy.
The second side of the democratic paradox of globalization
comes because of the mismatch between the polity that makes policy and the polity that is affected by policy. The government of
any country is no longer making policy just for its own people; in
an interconnected world, it is also making policy for citizens in
other countries because the ramifications of policy are not limited
by territorial boundaries. Once we admit the premise of interconnected policymaking- that the policy made (or not made) in one
any country will affect the welfare of people in other countrieswe recognize that globalization has strained the limits of current
conceptions of democracy by removing one of the essential assumptions of democratic legitimacy-the assumption that the impact of policy decisions is confined to a defined territory. David
Held has precisely identified the democratic assumption that is
violated in the modern world:
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries theorists of democracy have tended to assume a 'symmetrical'
and 'congruent' relationship between political decisionmakers and the recipients of political decisions. In fact,
symmetry and congruence have often been taken for
granted at two crucial points: first, between citizen voters
and the decision-makers whom they are in principle able to
hold to account; and secondly, between the 'output' (decisions, policies, and so on) of decision-makers and their constituents - ultimately, the 'people' in a delimited territory. 16

16

DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER 16

(1995) [hereinafter DE-

Held explored this idea in an earlier work as
well, See David Held, Democracy, the Nation-State, and the Global System, in
POLrICAL THEORY TODAY 197, 198 (David Held ed., 1991). See also Griinne De
Burca &Joanne Scott, The Impact of the WTO on EU Decision-Making,in THE EU AND
THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 27 (Grdinne de Burca & Joanne Scott
eds., 2001) ("[Rlegulatory choices (and many other kinds of decisions) adopted
within a single state have important consequences outside the territory of that
MOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER].
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In other words, once policy decisions in one country spill over
to affect the lives of people in another country, the concept of democratic decision-making loses trenchancy unless those adversely
affected by the decision are given a voice in influencing the decision. There are not one, but two democratic deficits in an interconnected world 17 and we need to rethink our concepts of democracy
in the globalized world in light of the paradox of global democracy. On the one hand, we must deal with the fact that international governance -institutions that invite transnational participation and new forms of democratic representation -takes decisions
further away from the direct sovereignty of the people. On the
other hand, we cannot afford to be without institutions that allow
representatives of the people of one country to have meaningful
input into the policy made in other countries that might affect
them, which I claim is the essential, and legitimizing, role of the
WTO.
In short, the democratic paradox of globalization requires us to
find new forms of democratic institutions and participation that
recognize both aspects of the democratic deficit brought about by
globalization. We need to increase participation by one country in
the policy decisions of another country when those decisions have
external effects. That is the primary legitimizing focus of international institutions. It is within that context that we need to determine what forms of participation in the work of the international
institution will advance the mission of the institution in spreading
global democracy and rights of participation.

state, the state no longer represents the uniquely appropriate site for democratic
decision-making.") (footnote omitted).
17 David Held captures in a single sentence both sides of the paradox of democracy in an interconnected world. He writes:
The argument in this volume suggests not only that both routine and extraordinary decisions taken by representatives of nations and nationstates profoundly affect citizens of other nation-states -who in all probability have had no opportunity to signal consent or lack of it-but also
that the international order is structured by agencies and forces over
which citizens have minimum, if any, control and in regard to which
they have little basis to signal their (dis)agreement.
DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 16, at 139.
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THE TWO VISIONS OF THE WTO

3.1. Shared Understandingof Mhat the IATO Does
The two visions of the WTO share an understanding of what
the WTO does and how it does it. The WTO -a kind of joint venture between its members -is an institution of barter, surveillance,
and adjudication.' 8 As an institution of barter, the WTO oversees a
process for negotiating and renegotiating treaties. As an institution
of surveillance, it administers the treaties and an intricate process
for overseeing compliance with the treaties. As an institution of
adjudication, the WTO oversees a dispute resolution process that
interprets and applies the treaties. The treaties, and the associated
surveillance and dispute resolution, constrain national decisionmaking on a host of issues that are loosely characterized as traderelated, but that in fact involve matters as diverse as public health
and intellectual property. 19
18 See generally RAJ BHALA & KEvIN KENNEDY,

WTO SYSTEM,

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND

WORLD

TRADE LAW: THE GATT-

U.S. LAW (1998). See also JOHN H.

JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1997) (detailing the WTO's role in developing trade

policy).
19 The treaties cover a broad range of subject matter and can be found in
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY

ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1999) [hereinafter LEGAL TEXTS]

and are annexes to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
The treaties include: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 94]
(setting basic obligations and exceptions); Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) (establishing a "code of civil procedure" for parties in
a dispute and a set of rules governing the Panels and Appellate Body); Agreement
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement) (covering issues in intellectual property); Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures, April 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL TEXTS 143 [hereinafter TRIMS Agreement] (covering some specific types of investment measures);
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL TEXTS 59 [hereinafter SPS Agreement]
(covering a host of measures designed to protect human, animal, and plant life);
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15,1994, WTO Agreement, Annex
1A, LEGAL TEXTS 121 [hereinafter TBT Agreement] (covering technical regulations
and standards); Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WNTO Agreement, Annex 1A,
LEGAL TEXTS 147 [hereinafter Antidumping Agreement] (covering the unfair practice of dumping by private parties); Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
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As an institution of barter-a forum for negotiating treatiesthe WTO (as did its predecessor organization, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades ("GATT')) sponsors "rounds" of negotiations on a comprehensive set of topics, 20 and an evolving set of
negotiating working groups on specific matters. During these negotiations each country takes a position on the topics to be discussed and the members work to find the common ground and
ways of aligning the interests of the members in some reciprocally
beneficial way. The negotiating rules reflect a mixture of consent
and compulsion. No country is bound by any obligation if it does
not consent to the obligation, but each member must accept all the
obligations as the price of WTO membership. In the original
rounds, the topic was tariffs, and member countries would agree,
for example, to lower tariffs on widgets if other countries would
lower their tariffs on gidgets. As tariff barriers came down and the
members began turning their attention to so-called non-tariff barriers, the subject matter of the negotiations expanded, ranging from
internal domestic policies that were thought to have an effect on
trade to the regulation of so-called "unfair" trading practices,
dumping and unlawful subsidies.
As an institution of surveillance, the WTO provides formal and
informal mechanisms by which each member can raise questions
about the policies of other members, 21 either to evaluate compliMeasures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL TEXTS 231 [hereinafter SCM Agreement]; Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994 WTO Agreement,
Annex 1A, LEGAL TEXTS 33 [hereinafter AA Agreement]; General Agreement on
Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1B, LEGAL TEXTS 284, 33
I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]; Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL TEXTS 275 [hereinafter Safeguards Agreement]; and Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex 1A, LEGAL TEXTS 73 [hereinafter ATC]. All WTO agreements are available
at Legal Texts: the WTO Agreements, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e
/legal-e/finale.htm.
20 See generally The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, at http://www
.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min0le/min0le.htm (showing an example of a round of negotiation). The current round of negotiations, the so-called
Doha Development Round, involves negotiations on a wide range of topics, including: agriculture, trade in services, intellectual property rights, transparency in
government procurement, trade and the environment, electronic commerce, and
integration of least developed countries into the multilateral trading system. See
Ministerial Declaration (Nov. 14, 2001), at http://www.wto.org/english
/thewto e/minisLe/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm. See also sources cited infra note 4.
21 Robert Howse discusses the legitimacy of this role in an insightful way
under the rubric of "legitimacy and bureaucratic power." See Howse, supra note
12, at 371-74.
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ance with the existing treaties or to raise issues with other countries that might be the subject of new rounds of negotiations. 22
Members are required to report on the measures they have taken to
meet their treaty obligations. The members meet regularly in formal meetings, and national delegations to the WTO meet informally, to discuss issues that one country raises about the policies of
another country. As those policy differences become crystallized
through these discussions, the issues can either be relegated to new
negotiations about the topic or, if the matter concerns an alleged
breach of existing treaty obligations, to dispute resolution.
As an institution of dispute resolution-the WTO's adjudicatory function- members may bring disputes before panels for decision, subject to appeal to the Appellate Body. 23 The jurisdiction
of the panels and Appellate Body is compulsory and subject to
relatively tight time limits. This function is now independent of
the legislative, treaty-making function of the WTO, removing the
lawmaking function from the direct control of the members, at
least as far as the panels and Appellate Body exercise their interpretive powers to make new law. Decisions are effectively bind-

22 Members raise issues unilaterally, of course. Many countries have ongoing
processes for examining the trade and other policies of foreign countries and issuing reports on those policies. Sections 301-309 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2411-2419 ("Section 301," amended several times, is one American statute allowing unilateral action). See generally BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 100980 (discussing Section 301 actions). A Section 301 investigation, which may result
in a sanction, can be brought by either a private individual or the U.S. Trade Representative. Id. at 1017. The aim of the investigation and possible retaliatory action is to "persuade another country's government to alter its behavior with respect to the treatment of American exports of goods and services to that country,
or with respect to the treatment of that country's exports of goods and services to
the United States." Id. at 1011. If the trade practice of a foreign country is one that
concerns intellectual property, then the statute used is "Special 301," 19 U.S.C. §
2242. Id. at 1009 n.1. There are important, mostly procedural, differences between
Section 301 and Special 301, but the ultimate aim is the same. Id. The statutory
provision known as "Super 301," 19 U.S.C. § 2420, forces "the USTR to initiate
Section 301 investigations against all significant trade barriers and market distorting practices" identified in the USTR's National Trade Estimate Report ("NTE").
Id. at 1073.
23 See generally BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 2648 (discussing dispute
settlement system); DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION
(James Cameron & Karen Campbell eds., 1998); JACKSON, supra note 18, at 107-37
(discussing the dispute settlement system); DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C.

MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE

(1999).
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ing24 so that when a treaty is interpreted through dispute resolution, a losing party must resort to a new series of negotiations to
get the interpretation overturned.
The WTO's subject matter domain is itself a constant subject of
debate between the members. 25 The topics covered by the
GATT/WTO treaties continue to expand, both to reflect a broader
range of non-tariff barriers and to link trade issues with other issues that bear on national prosperity. Two fundamental principles

of non-discrimination underlie the WTO system-the principle
that each member should treat each other member equally (the
Most Favored Nation principle), 26 and the principle that no foreign
business should be treated less favorably than a domestic business
(the National Treatment principle). 27 But each principle has important exceptions, and the scope and complexity of the provisions
needed to implement these basic principles and their exceptions
are staggering. 28
Most of the WTO obligations are prohibitory; they tell a country what it cannot do. Falling into this category are the prohibitions on discrimination and the prohibitions against raising tariffs

24 See John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement UnderstandingMisunderstandingson the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 63 (1997)
(discussing the difference between legally binding decisions and enforceable decisions).
25 Among the many works that discuss the domain of WTO lawmaking, the
recent ones are included in Symposium, The Boundaries of the WTO, 96 AM. J. INT'L

L. 1 (2002).
26 GATT 94, supra note 19, art. 1. See generally BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note
18, at 60-78 (discussing the Most Favored Nation principle ("MFN")); JACKSON,
supra note 18, at 157-73 (discussing MFN policy). In addition to the MFN commitment in article I, there are nine subject-specific MFN commitments in GATT,
and several of the twelve Uruguay Round agreements also have MFN or MFNlike clauses. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 68-69. For example, the SPS
Agreement states that "Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members
where identical or similar conditions prevail, including between their own territory and that of other Members." SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. II, para. 3.
27 GAT1r 94, supra note 19, art. III. See generally BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note
18, at 90-105 (discussing the national treatment principle); JACKSON, supra note 18,
at 213-28 (discussing the national treatment principle).
28 Exceptions to the MFN principle include Customs Unions and Free Trade
Areas, GATT! FINAL AGREEMENT art. XXIV, and the Generalized System of Preferences, which allows nations to favor developing countries in certain respects. See
BHALA & KENNEDY, supranote 18, at 417-30. Settling issues involving the National
Treatment principle may require decisions on issues of subsidies and products
standards. See TBT Agreement, supra note 19; SCM Agreement, supra note 19.
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once they have become "bound." 29 Some obligations, however, are
conditionally permissive; they tell a country what it can do if, but
only if, the country meets certain prerequisites. The rules relating
to safeguards against rapidly increasing imports, 30 and the rules allowing the imposition of antidumping duties3' or countervailing
duties, 32 are of this type. These treaties are permissive in the sense
that they authorize countries to erect trade barriers, but they seek
to channel those trade barriers through procedurally constricted
and substantively controlled paths. One WTO treaty, however, is
neither prohibitory nor conditionally permissive; it creates wholly
positive obligations by requiring member countries to act, even if
they are not in any way affecting trade. 33 The agreement relating
to intellectual property rights, TRIPS, requires each member to enact minimum levels of intellectual property protection and an independent means by which owners of the rights can enforce their
rights. 34
One can perceive from this brief sketch the outlines of the
popular debate about the legitimacy of the WTO. To defenders of
the WTO, the WTO obligations are the product of the policies of its
member countries, which in turn reflect each country's polity. In
this view, the positions that WTO members take during WTO negotiation, and their agreement to the outcome of the negotiations,
are the expression of national sovereignty rather than the antithesis
of national sovereignty. To the extent that member governments
are democratic, the positions of their countries must represent democratic values. To the WTO critics, however, the policies of the
WTO are too far removed from democratic law-making and consent to serve as a source of legitimacy. To them national policies
taken to the WTO are weighted too heavily by trade and corporate
29 See generally BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 78-90 (discussing tariff
bindings).
30 See Safeguards Agreement, supra note 19.
31 See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 19.
32 See SCM Agreement, supra note 19.
33 The commitments of WTO members in telecommunications also impose a
form of positive obligation on those countries that adhere to the agreement, since
they require policing of monopolistic practices, but these are plurilateral agreements. Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, Better Rules for a New Millennium: A Warning
Against Undemocratic Developments in the WTO, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 547, 560 (1999).
See generally Marco C.E.J. Bronkers, & Pierre Larouche, Telecommunications Services
and the World Trade Organization,31 J. WORLD TRADE, June 1997, at 5 (analyzing the
Fourth Protocol to the GATS).
34 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 19.
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interests, are too heavily influenced by the non-democratic negotiating process, and are too dependent on interpretation through the
unelected and unrepresentative dispute resolution system.
The two constitutional visions of the WTO assessed here ask
how an international institution that binds national policymaking
could be legitimate under concepts of democracy, federalism, and
sovereignty. The two visions provide strikingly different responses to the fundamental legitimacy issue.
3.2. The Internal, Economic Vision
The internal, economic vision of the WTO views the WTO to be
an important protection against misplaced domestic policy that
impairs economic efficiency. 35 This vision proceeds from the well-

35 In the United States, the constitutional version of this vision was laid out
most elaborately in John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Con-

stitution, 114 HARV. L. REv. 511 (2000). Earlier versions can be found in JAN
TUMLIR, PROTECrIONISM: TRADE POLICY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIEs 61-70 (1985);

Robert E. Hudec, "Circumventing" Democracy: The Political Morality of Trade Negotiations, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT' L L. & POL. 311 (1993); and Shell, supranote 11, at 877-94
(discussing models that can aid interpretation of WTO treaties, including the Efficient Market Model, which relies on the first vision). Some of the arguments advanced by Professors McGinnis & Movsesian were made earlier in the context of
European Constitutionalism by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann. See ERNST-ULRICH
PETERSMANN,

CONSTITUTIONAL

FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL

PROBLEMS OF

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1991) (discussing the constitutional function of
trade laws); see also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade Policy as a ConstitutionalProblem, On the "Domestic Policy Functions" of International Trade, 41
AUSSENWIRTSSCHRIFT 405 (1986) [hereinafter Petersmann, Trade Policy]. Professor
Petersmann's constitutional theory is, however, ambiguous, because it is
grounded on a "citizen oriented constitutional view of international law." ErnstUlrich Petersmann, The Transformationof the World Trading System Through the 1994
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 6 EuR. J. INT'L L. 161 (1995).
As I point out below, infra note 44 and accompanying text, Professor Petersmann's
analysis sometimes incorporates values that appear to be similar to the external,
participatory vision. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, From the Hobbesian International
Law of Coexistence to Modern Integration Law: The WTO Dispute Settlement System, 1
J. INT'L ECON. L. 175, 178 (1998) [hereinafter Petersmann, Hobbesian International
Law] (discussing a "citizen-oriented constitutional view of international law"). As
a result, his articulation of the constitutional theory underlying the WTO sometimes combines the interests of the citizen of the country that undertakes protectionist measures - the essence of the internal, economic vision - and the interests
of foreign citizens -the essence of the external, participatory vision. Compare Petersmann, Hobbesian InternationalLaw, at 198 (the internal, economic vision) with
Petersmann, Hobbesian International Law, at 177 ("National and international human rights also limit the foreign policy powers of governments and call for a rightsprotective reexamination of power-oriented 'Hobbesian interpretations' of national and international law.") (emphasis in original). The Petersmann articula-
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known economic analysis showing that free trade is good for a
country.36 Free trade is in the national interests (except in special
circumstances) 37 because the gains to consumers from free trade
always outweigh the losses to producers. Even if one were concerned about the losses that free trade causes to workers and domestic producers, one could simply compensate workers and producers for those losses through transfer payments financed out of
the gains from trade. Therefore, free trade is the best policy, and
under this view, the majority of voters should want free trade because that leaves them better off than protectionist policies. Most
voters are consumers and if they vote in their economic selfinterest, they would choose non-protectionist policies. Thus, it follows that if free trade is not the chosen policy it must be because
the democratic process has been skewed away from the majority,
or democratic will, to the will of the special interests. 38
The explanation of how the free trade inclinations of the majority of voters are hijacked by special interests is also a familiar one,
supplied by the literature on public choice. As one prominent account puts it:

tion of the internal, economic vision is described and criticized in Krajewski, supra

note 2, at 178-80.
36 McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 35, at 521. On the general economic
analysis of trade restraints, see Alan 0. Sykes, ComparativeAdvantage and the Normative Economics of International Trade Policy, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 49 (1998); and
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMics 17 (5th ed. 1973).
37 The "optimal tariff" analysis shows that when a country purchases a large
percentage of the international output of a product, a tariff may induce foreign
producers to sell for less in order to continue selling in the country. When that
occurs, the country imposing the tariff gets the tariff revenue without having to
pay more for the product and (assuming that other countries do not retaliate) is
therefore better off. See, e.g., Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stem, Current Issues
in Trade Policy: An Overview, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD
ECONOMY 15,37 (Robert M. Stern ed., 1987).
38 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations,
17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 398 (1996).

If the benevolent government assumption were true, e.g., that governments
maximize the public interest of their citizens, a liberal trade order should
emerge spontaneously pursuant to the today worldwide economic insight that trade liberalization tends to maximize consumer welfare by
enabling citizens to buy more, better and cheaper goods and services in
the best markets.
Id. at 400-01 (emphasis in original).
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As a result of real monetary losses [to domestic workers
and producers] and the patterns of human psychology [that
limit the ability of displaced workers and owners to see a
better future for themselves], then, workers and owners in
industries adversely affected by free trade will try to persuade the government to erect protectionist barriers. The
realities of interest group politics suggest that they will enjoy significant success. As concentrated groups, workers
and owners can obtain substantial benefits from government action. Consequently, these groups have strong incentives to provide campaign contributions and electoral
support in return for protectionist policies. In contrast,
groups that benefit from free trade, such as consumers, are
diffuse, and their gains, though large in the aggregate, tend
to be small on an individual basis. These groups have
comparatively few incentives to contribute time and money
to lobby for free trade policies. Moreover, they face high
agency costs in monitoring legislators to determine whether
their representatives are yielding to interest groups at the
39
expense of society as a whole.
The crux of this internal, economic vision is that the WTO promotes the "power of national democratic majorities by constraining
the influence of protectionist interest groups" (footnote omitted). 40
The WTO serves as a healthy antidote to these "special interests,"
and restores majoritarian will by restraining the ability of politicians
to serve the special interests. In this sense, the WTO helps preserve
democratic values and important individual economic freedoms by
supporting the will of the majority in the face of special interests who
4
would otherwise capture the mechanisms of public policy. '
39 McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 35, at 523-24 (footnotes omitted). See
also Petersmann, Trade Policy, supra note 35, at 406-07 ("Governments depend on
political support and accommodate interest group pressure. The asymmetries in
the organization and political influence of interest groups represent a permanent
threat to the equal rights of domestic citizens.").
40 McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 35, at 514.
41 Petersmann, Hobbesian InternationalLaw, supranote 35.
Just as economic theory demonstrates the individual and social benefits
of unilateral trade liberalization and deregulation, legal and democratic
theory confirms that 'democratization' and 'privatization' of international guarantees of freedom of trade... enhance the legal freedom and
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The internal, economic vision of the WTO has "garnered wide
acceptance as the raison d'6tre of the WTO."42 This internal, eco-

nomic vision is sometimes interpreted as a constitutional argument
by invoking the analogy of the dormant Commerce Clause, which
restrains the power of the states of the United States to interfere with
interstate commerce. Just as the dormant Commerce Clause restrains
the power of the states to be captured by special interests and discriminate against out-of-state citizens, the argument goes, the WTO
restrains the power of special interests to unduly influence national
economic policy. The thought has been expressed as follows:
In promoting both free trade and accountable democratic
government, the WTO reflects many of the principles that
inform federalism -the keystone of our own Constitution.
One effect of our original federal structure was to prevent
discrimination against interstate trade and thus restrain
protectionist interest groups. This free trade regime, in conjunction with an open national capital market, also restrained special interests more broadly, making it more difficult for them to exact resources from state governments.
In this way, federalism reinforced the power of majorities
within states while promoting a continental economy. Our
domestic trade constitution thus achieved the goals James
Madison set out for constitutionalism in general: '[t]o secure the public good and private rights against the danger
social welfare of domestic citizens and protect governments from protectionist pressures by 'rent-seeking' interest groups.

Id. at 198.
42 Steve Charnovitz, Triangulatingthe World Trade Organization,96 AM. J. INT'L
L. 28, 44 (2002) (discussing this rationale for WTO action as the "Self-Restraint"
rationale). Indeed, Charnovitz points out that the WTO itself, on its website, proclaims that "[glovernments need to be armed against pressure from narrow interest groups, and the WTO system can help." Id. (quoting World Trade Organization, Ten Benefits of the WTO Trading System, No. 9, at http://www.wto.org
/english/thewto.e/whatise/whatis_e.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2001)). The
website also says that "governments use the WTO as a welcome external constraint on their policies .... " Id. No. 10. The vision was endorsed by the United
States Trade Representative. See United States Trade Representative Robert B.
Zoellick, The WTO and New Global Trade Negotiations: What's at Stake, Speech
before the Council on Foreign Relations 3 (Oct. 30, 2001) (as prepared for delivery), at http://www.ustr.gov/speech-test/zoellick/zoellick_10.pdf ("WTO's procedural approach to counter protectionism and discrimination against commerce
reflects many of the insights that underpin our own Madisonian Constitution.").
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of... faction, and at the same time preserve the spirit and
the form of popular government.. ...43
This vision thus combines the traditional, economic argument for

free trade with an argument for majoritarian democracy, drawing
heavily on supposed principles of federalism that are embedded in
constitutional regimes. It thus claims to support a constitutional vision of the WTO. It is not, however, the only constitutional vision of

the WTO. Before showing why this internal, economic vision is inaccurate and unduly narrow, let me sketch the contours of the alternative constitutional vision: the external, participatory vision.
3.3. The External, ParticipatoryVision
The alternative vision of the WTO is the vision that animates
any federal system-the need to situate policymaking at a level
that includes representatives of all those who are affected by the
policy. As I now discuss, this vision recognizes that when governments make economic policy, they often impose costs on people
in other countries, and that those people who are adversely affected have little influence over, or participation in, the policymaking. The WTO provides a forum that allows those who are adversely affected by the policy made in other countries to have a
voice in changing that policy.44
43

McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 35, at 514 (footnotes omitted) (quoting

THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Mentor 1999)

(1961)). The authors enlarge on the constitutional underpinnings of the United
States common market. See id. at 536-38.
44 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How To Promote the InternationalRule of Law?
Contributions by the World Trade Organization Appellate Review System, 1 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 25 (1998).
The world-wide guarantees of freedom, non-discrimination, intellectual
property rights and quasi-judicial dispute settlement procedures in WTO
law illustrate that liberal international trade organizations can serve
'constitutional functions' for the protection of freedom, nondiscrimination, private property rights and access to courts across frontiers. In a globally integrated world, the lesser protection of transnational
transactions than of purely national transactions, and of the transnational
exercise of citizen rights, no longer make economic or democratic sense.
Id. at 31 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). See also Raustiala, supra note 12,
at 414 ("The protection of foreign interests that may be 'stakeholders' but lack
formal representation is the primary benefit [of the WTO]."); DeBurca & Scott, supra note 16, at 28 ("[It may be argued that the WTO, through the constitution of
due process requirements, promotes transnational political engagement which
may serve to accentuate the gap between atomistic political community and mul-
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Take the most basic subject of WTO lawmaking -tariffs -for
example. The first, internal vision focuses on the effects of a tariff

on the consumers in the country imposing the tariff. It finds the
tariff objectionable on the basis of economic policy and views the
WTO to be a helpful antidote to special interests that would injure
consumer welfare with a tariff. The second, external vision looks
at the impact of a tariff on people in other countries. This vision
sees tariffs as a kind of taxation without representation -a tax on
foreign producers who in the absence of an international organiza-

tion have no voice in either opposing or shaping the tariff. 45 The
damage from the tariff that this vision highlights is not just the
tiple, overlapping communities defined by inter-dependence rather than splendid
isolation."). Professor Howse's analysis of the application of concepts of deliberative democracy in the SPS Agreement contains reverberations of the external, participatory vision. Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation
on Trial at the World Trade Organization,98 MICH. L. REv. 2329, 2356-57 (2000).
45 The theory articulated here is similar in spirit and emphasis, but different
in detail, from the external, market access theory developed over a series of articles by several prominent trade experts. See Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis, &
Robert W. Staiger, It's a Question of Market Access, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 56 (2002); Kyle
Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, An Economic Theory of GATT, 89 AM. EcoN. REV. 215
(1999); Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty,
and International Economic Institutions, 116 Q. J. ECON. 519 (2001); Kyle Bagwell &
Robert W. Staiger, The WTO as a Mechanism for Securing Market Access Property
Rights: Implicationsfor Global Labor and Environmental Issues, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 69
(2001); KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, GATr7-THNK, Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, (Working Paper 8005 (2000)), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8005
.pdf. The usual economic account assumes that prices in the country imposing the
tariff rise by the amount of the tariff so that foreign producers who sell in the
market receive higher prices. The account of Bagwell, Mavroidis, and Staiger
turns on demonstrating that part of the cost of a tariff is borne by foreign exporters. To them, because prices in the protected market do not rise by the full
amount of the tariff, foreign exporters must lower their price in order to get into
the market, giving the tariff an external effect by reducing the profits of foreign
producers. Once one finds an external effect of the tariff in this way, it follows
that governments of the exporting country will want to bargain away those adverse effects, which in turn explains why we need an international institution to
allow countries to bargain over these external effects. This account is similar to
mine because it emphasizes the external impact of the tariff on foreigners and portrays those external effects as the engine that drives the WTO. My account, however, avoids the issue of the effect of tariffs on the prices received by exporters
into the protected market. I simply point out that the external effect of a tariff is
not necessarily that foreign producers make fewer profits after the tariff, but that
they make fewer sales. Whatever happens to prices, the country providing the
protection makes sales that could efficiently have been made by foreign firms.
That alone is enough to give foreign countries an interest in the decision of
whether a country should impose the tariff, and therefore is enough to give foreign countries the incentive to seek to avoid that harm through an international
institution.
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economic inefficiency in the country imposing the tariff but the
representational, participatory deficiency that results because the
tariff distorts the competitive opportunities and market freedoms
of people in foreign countries who have no voice in determining
whether the tariff will be imposed and how the costs of the tariff
will be distributed. The WTO provides the forum in which the

governments of those adversely affected people seek to ameliorate
that harm. The WTO is a form of participatory policymaking for
foreigners who would otherwise not have effective influence over

economic policies that hurt them. 46
Economic policymaking in one country routinely imposes costs
on foreigners and discounts the interests of the foreigners who are
adversely affected by the policy. A subsidy in one country hurts

47
the competitive prospects of manufacturers in other countries.
Regulatory decisions mandating technical standards for products
or licensing requirements often impose disproportionate costs on
foreigners. Without a forum for challenging those economic decisions, foreigners are denied the basic right to have input into policy
that affects their lives and livelihoods. 48
Indeed, costs are often imposed on foreigners precisely because
the foreigners do not vote, and because their voices have less resonance than domestic voices in any policy debate. Sometimes these
costs are imposed to gain support or overcome resistance from
domestic industries that are also regulated. A domestic industry

resistant to regulation can be "bought off" by imposing disproporThe point is not, of course, that any person has a right to import or export
or that free trade is a form of protected constitutional interest. The point, instead,
is that under any meaningful concept of democracy, those who are adversely affected by policy ought to have a voice in shaping that policy. This participatory
right transcends and is separable from the right to trade in itself.
47 For a particularly poignant depiction of the way that American subsidies to
American cotton farmers almost directly take money away from cotton farmers in
Mali, see Roger Thurow, Hanging by a Thread: In U.S., Cotton Farmers Thrive; In Africa, They Fight to Survive, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2002, at Al, A4.
48 The phenomenon of policymaking without representation is not limited, of
course, to economic or trade policy. The range of policy matters in which one
country can adversely affect the interests of the people of another country by acting (or refusing to act) in a way that is detrimental to them, but without their participation, is the single greatest force driving international law. It is the force underlying cooperation in all regulatory fields - environmental and digital, criminal
and civil. Indeed, it is the pervasiveness of the need for dealing with these external effects of under-inclusive democratic institutions that makes the external, participatory vision of the WTO a widely acceptable - and therefore attractive - one.
See infra text accompanying notes 169-71.
46
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tionate costs on foreign rivals. 49 At other times, the costs are imposed on foreigners not to discriminate against them, but to avoid
disproportionate costs on domestic businesses. When the United
States imposed costly regulations on U.S. shrimp fishermen to help
save endangered sea turtles, Congress soon required that similar
costs be imposed on foreign shrimp fishermen. This not only
helped protect endangered sea turtles in other countries, it also
took away the competitive advantage that foreign shrimp fishermen would have had were they able to catch shrimp without the
costly equipment. Protection of the sea turtle required that these
costs be imposed on foreigners.
When a country imposes costs such as these, it does so without
the effective participation of people who are adversely affected by
the costs. Admittedly, foreign companies with a presence in a
country can be active participants in the policymaking of that
country. But participation by foreigners is sharply regulated by
countries and is protected by neither international law nor most
domestic constitutions. And for most foreigners and foreign companies who have no presence in a country, participation in the
policymaking of that country is functionally unavailable.5 0 Without that participation, costs can be imposed on them without any
ability to influence the policy decisions.
The WTO masterfully addresses the problem of unrepresentative decision-making in national forums by allowing countries to
represent their interests, and the interests of their people, to the
governments of other countries in a way that can bring about policy changes and reduce the harms. In a stylized version, the negotiating forum provided by the WTO allows one country to identify
a tariff of a second country that is particularly harmful, and to bargain to have that tariff (and that harm) removed. When the second
country faces a reciprocal harm from a tariff imposed by the first
country, the two countries can agree to lower their tariffs on each
other's products and thus avoid the harms. Through the WTO ne49 See, e.g., Results of the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations:Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on Finance, 103d Cong. 240, 252 (1994) (statement of Ralph
Nader) (claiming that domestic laws such as bans on the export of raw logs are
necessary to buy the loyalty of domestic industry in exchange for accepting conservation limits on logging).
50 McGinnis & Movsesian recognize that "foreign producers, the interest
group that would naturally benefit most from reduced domestic barriers, are not
represented in the [national] polity." McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 35, at

527.
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gotiations, the countries have participated in cooperative policymaking that allows the policy of each country to reflect (and avoid)
the costs that would otherwise be imposed on the other country. It
is a wonderful economic benefit that through these negotiations
the global economy becomes more efficient. But, I would argue,
the broader importance of the negotiations is not economic but political. In a world where economic and social forces are not naturally confined by borders, the WTO process allows all of those adversely affected by policy to participate in shaping that policy.
The external, participatory vision of the WTO therefore sees the
WTO as a complex, multiparty forum for barter between nations
that allows each nation to represent the interests of its constituents
to other nations, and facilitates agreements that reduce the harmful
external effects of national policy. The forums that the WTO maintains for negotiation, consultation, and surveillance allow countries
to comment on, and influence, the policies of other countries.51
Some will be surprised to see that the WTO, which is so commonly thought of as a trade, and therefore an economic organization, is in fact legitimized on an essentially political basis. It must
be remembered, however, that the WTO's predecessor, GATT, was
born out of the experience of the competitive devaluations and escalating tariffs between the two World Wars.5 2 The designers of
GATT understood the organization to be an important way of promoting stability and peace following World War II; they fully
understood that tariff increases could be a form of assault on another country. Their vision for the GATT was part of a larger po-

51

To be sure, the WTO system for allowing one country to represent the in-

terests of its people in challenging the policies of other countries is not perfect.
The bartering system is heavily weighted by wealth, and is subject to the imperfections of any bartering market. Nor is the WTO system truly representative of
democracy. Interests within a country are not individually represented. Rather,
each country determines, based on its internal political process, how much weight
to give to the contending interests within the country as it adopts its negotiating
position. Environmental interests that are strong across borders may be less forceful than they would be in an international representational forum because each
country may downplay environmental interests in determining what its position
at the WTO should be. Nonetheless, the WTO fosters a form of participatory
lawmaking that would otherwise be unavailable, and that provides a healthy antidote to economic parochialism in an interconnected world.
52 See generally BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 1-3 (summarizing the origins of GATT); JACKSON, supra note 18, at 27-28 (recounting the history of GATr as
derived from the Bretton Woods organizations, including the IMF and the World
Bank).
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litical vision that would help to prevent economic warfare from
threatening economic cooperation and stability.
As a result, the value that underlies this vision of the WTO can

be seen not as the value of free markets from an economic standpoint, but as the value of free markets from the standpoint of freedom-the freedom to produce and sell what and where one
wants5 3- and the importance of not taking away that freedom
without hearing from those whose freedom is being curtailed. 54
The value is participation in policymaking that affects one's important freedoms. This is a constitutional value of great importance
and one that is fully consistent with concepts of federalism, sovereignty, and democracy.

53 For a good statement of the relationship between economic freedom and
political freedom, see AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).

54 F.A. Hayek, writing during World War II, understood both the problem of

economic nationalism and the institutional solution to it. The problem was clear.
He took it to be axiomatic that:
[T]here is little hope of international order or lasting peace so long as
every country is free to employ whatever measures it thinks desirable in
its own immediate interest, however damaging they may be to others .... Many kinds of economic planning are indeed practicable only if
the planning authority can effectively shut out all extraneous influences;
the result of such planning is therefore inevitably the piling-up of restrictions on the movements of men and goods.... If the resources of different nations are treated as exclusive properties of these nations as wholes,
if international economic relations, instead of being relations between
individuals, become increasingly relations between whole nations organized as trading bodies, they inevitably become the source of friction and
envy between whole nations.
F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 220-21 (1944). As for the institutional solution,
Hayek wrote:
[W]e cannot hope for order or lasting peace after this war if states, large
or small, regain unfettered sovereignty in the economic sphere. But this
does not mean that a new superstate must be given powers which we
have not learned to use intelligently even on a national scale, that an international authority ought to be given power to direct individual nations how to use their resources. It means merely that there must be a
power which can restrain the different nations from action harmful to
their neighbors, a set of rules which defines what a state may do, and an
authority capable of enforcing these rules. The powers which such an
authority would need are mainly of a negative kind; it must, above all,
be able to say 'No' to all sorts of restrictive measures.
Id. at 232-33.
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DEMOCRACY, FEDERALISM, AND SOVEREIGNTY

When we assess the two visions of the WTO against the interrelated concepts of democracy, federalism, and sovereignty, we find
that the internal, economic vision is an inappropriate application of
these concepts, while the external, participatory vision is fully supported by them.
4.1. The External, ParticipatoryVision Better Reflects Democratic
Values for Making Policy Within a Country
Both visions of the WTO are grounded in an understanding of
the appropriate scope of economic policymaking within a country.
The external, participatory vision is based on domestic policymaking that is subject to a full range of values in a pluralistic society,
including both efficiency and non-efficiency values. These values
are subject only to the constraint that they be subject to international negotiation when the policies impinge on the welfare of others. The internal, economic vision is based on economic policymaking that is one-dimensional -directed at only efficiency values,
with little room in policy decisions for distributional or other nonefficiency values. As an economic vision, the internal vision has
much to offer. However, as a vision that purports to stand on-or
advance - democratic and constitutional goals, the internal, economic vision is flawed in fundamental respects. It is based on the
misperception that protectionist policies can result only from government failure to adequately protect against special interests, and
it seeks to return public policy to the time when the constitution
was construed to advance efficiency values over non-efficiency
values. Neither conception is valid.
4.1.1.

Trade Policy and Special Interests

The internal, economic vision is supported on the basis of familiar public choice arguments55 - that special interests capture the
policymaking process and skew policy from the public interest.
This argument turns, of course, on the assumption that what matters to voters is the effect of policies on their pocketbooks -that
voters in a democracy always prefer a policy that enhances their
individual economic well-being over a policy that reduces their individual economic well-being. Without that assumption, the pub-

55

See supra text accompanying notes 3541.
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lic choice story cannot demonstrate that the economic policy of
protectionism is necessarily adverse to the interests of most voters,
or the result of political failure.5 6 The logical argument underlying
the public choice analysis -that voters want free trade and that if a
different policy is chosen it must be because of a political failure
and capture by special interests -collapses if in fact voters vote not
in their economic self-interest but out of an altruistic interest in the
welfare of others. In fact, we have no reason to believe that people
always vote for their narrow economic interest, and therefore no
reason to believe that majority politics will lead automatically to
free trade policies if special interests did not capture the political
process.57
I am not, of course, challenging the assumption that voters are
rational or that they vote in a self-interested way in some broad
sense. Naturally, voters act rationally and in their interests (as they
define them) in the sense that they vote for what they find to be
appealing, right, or in accord with their preferences. But, that
makes the assumption of the rational or self-interested voter a
mere tautology and of no analytical value.5 8 What I am challenging is the assumption that the rational voter will always define the
56 Raustiala, supra note 12, at 415 (claiming that the internal, economic vision

"rests on the assumption that the majority's only political preference is for economic gain").

57 Even if voters were always self-interested, of course, the public choice
analysis underlying the internal, economic vision of the WTO falters on its acsumption that lawmakers always vote in a way that reflects their narrow interest,

when, in fact, legislators sometimes vote for what they believe to be in the public
interest even if doing so hurts them politically. See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Legislative
Chaos: An Exploratory Study, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 425, 433 (1994) (discussing
seven factors involved in legislation).
8 Some economists seek to interpret voting behavior in favor of distributive
programs as self-interested. See, e.g., STEVEN E. RHOADS, THE EcoNoMIST's VIEW OF

83, 130-36 (1985) (interpreting support by middle-class and upper-class voters for welfare proposals as
self-interested because it is thought to reduce crime, and interpreting personal
charity as reducing guilt). I have no quarrel with that view, but it does not advance analysis. The issue is not whether voting behavior is in accord with preference functions or broad self-interest-of course it is. The issue that is key to understanding public choice analysis is whether voting behavior is dictated by the
voter's narrow economic self-interest or whether the voting behavior takes the interests of others into account. The motivation for voting for distributive programs
could be described as either self-interested (in the economist's sense) or altruistic,
and neither description is demonstrably right or wrong. It is the behavior that
matters, and the fact that voters do not always vote in their immediate selfinterest defeats the premise on which the internal, economic vision of the WTO is
based.
THE WORLD: GOVERNMENT, MARKETS, AND PUBLIC PoLICY
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"correct" policy as the policy that improves the voter's immediate
economic position. The claim here is that voters are often influenced by factors other than their own immediate self-interest, and
thus there is no a priori support for the proposition that sound
public policy would, in the absence of political capture, lead to
policies that aggregate the individual welfare of each citizen.
A voter will deviate from narrow self-interest when the connection between any particular policy and a particular voter's well being is attenuated or disputed, making it difficult for the selfinterested voter to know where his or her self-interest lies. Steel
tariffs raise the price of automobiles, but bring economic benefits to
communities. Even members of the community who are not steel
workers may find their self-interest undefined. Voters may therefore easily fall back on available symbols and heuristics to make
decisions, thereby removing decision-making from the sphere of
narrow self-interest.5 9 We have no doubt, of course, that general
economic conditions influence voting behavior, a conclusion well
supported by the available empirical studies 60 long before the first
Clinton campaign for President rode to victory on the phrase, It's
The Economy, Stupid. But as one researcher reported, studies
"have found little evidence that the aggregate level findings [concerning the economy and voting patterns] can be explained by
people voting in accord with changes in their personal wellbeing."61
Moreover, voting behavior often can be explained by the altruistic voter, one who is willing to sacrifice his or her own immediate
economic interest to support the welfare of another, one whose
preference function includes a preference for the welfare of oth-

59 Stanley Feldman, Economic Self-Interest and Political Behavior, 26 AM. J. POL.

Scl. 446,463 (1982).
60

EDWARD R. TuFTE, POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY (1978); Samuel Ker-

nell, Explaining PresidentialPopularity, 72 AM. POL. Sct. REV. 506 (1978) (relating
presidential popularity to the economy); Allan H. Meltzer & Marc Vellrath, The
Effects of Economic Policies on Votes for the Presidency: Some Evidence from Recent Elections, 18 J.L. & ECON. 781 (1975); Kristen R. Monroe, Econometric Analyses of Electoral Behavior: A Critical Review, 1 POL. BEHAV. 137 (1979). Not all studies support
this conclusion. See Francisco Arcelus & Allan H. Meltzer, The Effect of Aggregate
Economic Variables on CongressionalElections, 69 AM. PoL. ScL REV. 1232 (1975); John
R. Owens & Edward C. Olson, Economic Fluctuationsand CongressionalElections, 24
AM. J.POL. ScI. 469 (1980); George J. Stigler, Micropolitics and Macroeconomics: General Economic Conditionsand National Elections, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 160 (1973).

Feldman, supra note 59, at 447 (citing studies by M.P. Fiorina (1978), R.
Klorman (1978), S. Wides (1976,1979), and L. Sigelman & Y. Tsai (1981)).
61
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ers. 62 A person may take pleasure in seeing the state help others,
or may define his or her own welfare in terms of the welfare of
others. 63 A citizen could, for example, rationally feel better if
steelworkers were not thrown out of work by imports (even if the
citizen had to pay more for an automobile). This could be either
because of genuine empathy for the steelworkers and the satisfaction one gets from helping others in need, or because she hopes
that if she is laid off, public policy will return the favor. 64 Under
any of these scenarios, the voter is not acting in his or her shortterm economic interest.
Further, experimental research supports the view that voters
often choose policies that avoid risks and uncertainties. 65 Policy
driven by the general interest (as opposed to special interests) may
well be path dependent: policy makers may have a healthy regard
for existing expectations and property rights or a cautious response
to the uncertainties associated with change. For similar reasons, it
has been suggested that public policy is often skewed toward
avoiding harm rather than embracing possible benefits, reflecting
the fact that voters prefer policies that avoid the infliction of pain
to small numbers of people over policies that provide small bene-

62 See generally STEVEN KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY: A HOPEFUL VIEW OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 23947 (1987) (describing the origins and nature of altru-

ism in voters).
63 See, e.g.,

ROBERT E. BALDWIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. IMPORT

POLICY, 18 (1985):

It is evident, however, that such considerations as equity, social justice,
and patriotism may also affect public policy choices. Thus the fact that a
high proportion of the labor force employed in textiles consists of lowincome workers may account partly for the protection granted this industry in many developed countries.
Id, Models in which altruism plays an important role include: JAMES S.
DUESENBERRY, INCOME, SAVING, AND THE THEORY OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 101

(1949); Michael J. Boskin & Eytan Sheshinski, Optimal Redistributive Taxation when
Individual Welfare Depends upon Relative Income, 92 Q. J. EcoN. 589 (1978); Harold
M. Hochman &James D. Rodgers, ParetoOptimal Redistribution, 59 AM. ECON. REV.
542, 543 (1969).
64 Some public policies may therefore be seen as types of insurance policies,
not only for those directly benefited by the policy, but also by those who fear that
they might need the benefits in the future and are willing to buy the insurance
now,
65 George A. Quattrone & Amos Tversky, ContrastingRational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice, 82 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 719 (1988) (noting that people
value policies that avoid losses more highly than policies to increase gains even
when the projected payoff is identical).
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fits to many. 66 Under any of these theories, because policy is motivated by a preference function that does not reflect the voter's own
economic benefit from policy, public policy will deviate from efficient policy.
Admittedly, good empirical evidence of voter motivation is difficult to find; empirical studies of voter motivation are fraught with
methodological problems. 67 Data sets usually contain aggregate
voting information covering disparate classes of voters, making it
difficult for researchers to generalize about why a group of voters
with an identified interest voted the way they did. Moreover, most
candidates represent a multitude of issues, making it difficult to
match any particular candidate with any particular interest group.
And even when results show a relationship between a homogeneous voter group and an identifiable issue, the results are difficult to
interpret.
The available empirical evidence, however, supports the view
that voters sacrifice their narrow economic interests to endorse policy that reaches broader objectives. One study looked at voting
behavior in a single-issue referendum to finance flood control in a
flood plane, a result that would impose costs on all voters but directly benefit only those living or working in the flood plane. The
study showed that a model of narrow self-interest could predict
neither the actual voter turnout nor the voting results. The voting
could only be explained by voters' understanding of, and motivation by, community benefits and civic pride. 68 Similarly, support
for welfare policies is highest among groups that have homogeneous racial, ethnic, or religious characteristics, and lower among

66 See, e.g., W.M. CORDEN, TRADE POLICY AND EcoNoMic WELFARE 107-08
(1974) (The "conservative social welfare function" expresses a number of ideas:
that it is "unfair" to see the income of any significant portion of the population
reduced without offsetting benefits; that it serves as a form of social insurance system that increases everyone's real income; and that it preserves social peace by
reducing inequalities in income).
67 These methodological problems are discussed in Robert Deacon & Perry
Shapiro, Private Preferencefor Collective Goods Revealed Through Voting on Referenda,
65 AM. ECON. REV. 943 (1975); David Lowery & Lee Sigelman, Understanding the

Tax Revolt: Eight Explanations,75 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 963 (1981); Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Voting in a Local School Election: A Micro Analysis, 59 REv. EcoN. STAT. 30 (1977);
Leonard Shabman & Kurt Stephenson, A Critique of the Self-Interested Voter Model:
The Case of a Local Single Issue Referendum, 4 J. ECON. ISSUES 1173 (1994).
68 See Shabman & Stephenson, supranote 67, at 1194.
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heterogeneous groups, 69 suggesting that voting patterns for welfare are influenced by group identity not individual self-interest.
Similarly, the notion that people make decisions based on altruistic rather than narrow selfish interests runs throughout the literature now emerging under names such as "law and behavioral scidecision theory,"71 or "behavioral
ence," 70 "behavioral
economics." 72 By exploring the ways in which people choose fair
outcomes rather than rationally self-interested outcomes, and by
showing the ways that people expend resources to help achieve
public goods, this literature provides clear evidence that a voter's
decisions need not be guided only by her immediate and direct
self-interest.
The problem, of course, is our inability to disentangle the "special interests" that the democratic majority desires to avoid from
the interests that the public deems to be special because they touch
people's notion of appropriate non-efficiency goals. 73 More con69 Erzo F.P. Luttmer, Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution, 109 J. POL.
EcoN. 500 (2001).
70 For one example of this approach, see Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S.
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1053, 1057 (2000).
71 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000).
72 For an example of this perspective, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW
AND ECONOMICS (2000).
73 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, The Public Choice Threat, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 941, 954
(2000) ("Everyone can complain about special interests not to their liking, even
while exalting the groups they identify with, or favor, as engaging in civic republicanism, offsetting evil special interests, and so forth."). The image of the selfinterested voter is often built on attenuated grounds. For example, Robert Cooter
argues:

Survey research reveals that voters know little about issues or candidates, so they typically rely on guidance from political parties, ideology
and informed friends or associates. In spite of their ignorance, however,
citizens tend to vote for candidates who promote the interests of the
groups to which they belong. For example, farmers tend to vote for candidates who subsidize agriculture, ethnic groups tend to vote for candidates who benefit minorities, and investment bankers tend to vote for
candidates who liberalize finance.
ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTTuTION 19 (2000) (citation omitted). This
account seems to be a slim reed on which to build a theory of the self-interested
voter. Voters decide what group to join, so their affiliation with a group may just
as well reflect their altruistic interest as their self-interest. Those interested in the
environment join environmental groups and those interested in fostering moral
values can join religious groups. The fact that voters take their cues from groups
does not mean that voters join groups to promote their own interests.
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cretely, we have no test, and certainly no constitutional test, for determining whether public institutions place restrictions on steel
imports because special interests override the majority desire for
lower prices, or whether the majority of voters would rather not
see their neighbors thrown out of work. The fact that public policy
takes a protectionist, non-efficiency turn does not necessarily mean
it has been captured by "special interests." It could have been captured by a non-efficiency goal that is special to a majority of voters.
Moreover, the difficulty of differentiating "special interests"
from the interests that in fact guide public policy is exacerbated by
the problem that the special interests have superior access to information; consequently, we must ask their opinion about policy in
order to form appropriate policy. 74 When we want to know the optimum length of patent protection, for example, we need to ask the
inventive community about the cost and risks of inventive activity
and we need to take seriously their responses. If we then increase
the rewards to inventive activity, perhaps by increasing the length
or geographic scope of patent protection, 75 we cannot tell from the
identity of those giving us the information and asking us to act
whether we have responded to rent-seeking behavior or to the
genuine need for greater incentives in the patent system. Similarly,
if we want to know the impact of imports on the steel industry, the
steel industry is in the best position to get us the information.
Whether and how we act on that information is up to us, but the
fact that we got the information from "special interests" does not
make the resulting policy illegitimate.
In short, the internal, economic vision of the WTO shortchanges the values that animate any democracy by assuming that
voters care, or should only care, about efficiency values. This vision would freeze public policy in an efficiency-only mode and
would put the WTO in the position of blocking out policies that reflect the values of the altruistic voter. By contrast, as already mentioned, the external, participatory vision lets democratic policymaking reflect the full range of values that people care about and
thus supports a broader vision of democratic policymaking.

74

McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 35 (recognizing this difficulty).

75

See TRIPS Agreement, supranote 19, § 5, art. 27 (governing patentable sub-

ject matter).
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The Constitution and Efficiency Values

The constitutional claim of the internal, economic vision is misguided precisely because it seeks to return constitutional jurispru-

dence to the Lochner era7 6 the era when the Supreme Court invalidated legislation on the ground that the legislation interfered with
freedom of property and contract. During this period, the Court
tried to give the U.S. Constitution some efficiency-based content-

to find some basis for balancing the value of free markets against
the interest of the people in promoting non-economic values. 77 Although the assault on legislation was primarily directed at domestic legislation-the Supreme Court invalidated, among other
things, laws setting maximum prices,78 laws restricting entry into
certain businesses, 79 and laws setting minimum wages 8° - the assault might just as easily have freed up foreign trade. Because an

76 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding that freedom of
contract is a liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). On the Lochner era
in general, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

474-94 (1997); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND
DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993); HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937 171-204 (1991); PAUL KENS,
LOCHNER V. NEW YORK, ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL (1998); MICHAEL J.
PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS FROM
THE 1890s TO THE 1930s (2001); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1332-81 (3d ed. 2000).
77 The "judges who developed substantive due process... hid, suppressed,
or trivialized underlying conflicts about how wealth should be distributed. Their
political economy convinced them that questions about economic regulation
should be treated as nothing more than questions about economic efficiency."
HOVENCAMP, supra note 76, at 176. "The Court was widely (even if not always correctly) perceived as substituting its own judgment, in the absence of any actual
constitutional mandate, for that of the legislature." TRIBE, supra note 76, at 12. See
also GILLMAN, supra note 76, at 12 (arguing that the Court was looking only at
whether the legislation was truly in the public interest or was instead only a
wealth transfer from one group of citizens to another).
78 Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (gasoline); Ribnik v.
McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) (employment agencies); Tyson & Bros. (United Theatre Ticket Offices) v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (theater tickets). The Court overturned maximum prices when the business was perceived to affect the public interest. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (price controls for rental housing);
German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914) (price controls for fire insurance); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (grain elevators).
79 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (manufacture of ice);
Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917) (employment agencies who charge potential
employees a fee).
80 Moorhead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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import quota or tariff can impair the ability of economic actors to
enter into mutually beneficial contracts, it is not farfetched to suggest that tariff restrictions themselves might have been invalidated

under Lochner.81
As is well known, the Lochner era attempt to give efficiency
values some explicit weight in the Constitution was unsustainable
and the doctrine was abandoned. 82 The Court could find no
workable framework for defining the economic principles to which
freedom of contract and property were dedicated and no basis for
balancing interference with contract and property against the public interest ideals of sound legislation. The collapse of the Lochner
era represents an explicit recognition that the Constitution protects
efficiency values only as a by-product of protecting values implicit
in other constitutional provisions, such as procedural due process,83 the Takings Clause,84 and dormant Commerce Clause juris81 A right to free trade has, of course, never been recognized under the Constitution and has been explicitly denied both before and after Lochner. See, e.g., Ar-

jay Assoc. Inc. v. Bush, 891 F.2d 894, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("When the people
granted Congress the power 'To regulate Commerce with foreign nations,' they
thereupon relinquished at least whatever rights they, as individuals, may have
had to insist on the importation of any product ...
.") (quoting U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, §
8, cl.3). Nonetheless, the Lochner cases recognized rights to contract that could not
be abridged by the legislature, and it is not clear why the right to sell one's services for below a minimum wage or the right to enter a business should be protected for domestic citizens while the analogous rights should not be protected for
foreigners. That the right to import has never been constitutionally recognized is
a testament to the arbitrary and differential treatment of foreigners and foreign
trade rather than to the logic of legally protected economic rights. The proponents of the internal, economic vision would reverse this differential treatment,
seeing a constitutional value in the right to free trade.
82 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding federal
law prohibiting mixed milk and vegetable oil beverage); West Coast Hotel v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage law for women employees).
83 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[Nlor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law ....
"); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. V (containing a parallel provision not directly addressed to the states).
Representative cases in which economic regulation was struck down because of
procedural improprieties in its adoption include: Gibson v.Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,
579 (1973) (holding that the determination of when free markets should be regulated should not be left to those with a "substantial pecuniary interest" in the outcome of the decision); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (ruling
that "one [private] person may not be entrusted with the power to regulate the
business of another, and especially of a competitor"), See also A.L.A. Schecter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down delegation of
power to President to regulate fair competition); Washington ex rel. Seattle Title
Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928) (invalidating city zoning ordinance); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912) (striking down city building ordinance). Of course, not all due process challenges to economic regulation are ac-
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prudence. 85 Outside the ambit of those particular provisions, 86 the
cepted. New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978) ("Once
having enacted a reasonable general scheme of business regulation, California
was not required to provide for a prior individualized hearing each and every
time the provisions of the Act had the effect of delaying the consummation of the
business plans of particular individuals."). See generally Peter M. Gerhart, Constitutional Limits on State Regulatory and Protectionist Policies, 48 ANTITRUST L. J. 1351
(1980). See also City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 674
n.8, 679 (1976) (discussing the City charter provision which required that any
change in land use agreed to by the city council be approved by fifty-five percent
vote in a referendum, and concluding that "[als a basic instrument of democratic
government, the referendum process does not, in itself, violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when applied to a rezoning ordinance").
The court also stated:
By its nature, zoning 'interferes' significantly with owners' uses of property. It is hornbook law that 'mere diminution of market value or interference with the property owner's personal plans and desires relative to
his property is insufficient to invalidate a zoning ordinance or to entitle
him to a variance or rezoning.
Id. at 674 n.8 (citation omitted); General Elec. Co. v. New York Dept. of Labor, 936
F.2d 1448, 1455 (1991) (stating that the Eubank and Roberge lines of cases "still
stand for the proposition that a legislative body may not constitutionally delegate
to private parties the power to determine the nature of rights to property in which
other individuals have a property interest, without supplying standards to guide
the private parties' discretion").
84 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation."). For background and history on the takings clause
see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 76, at 504-24, and William Michael Treanor, The
Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 782 (1995). Although originally understood to require physical seizure by
the government, since 1922 the Court has recognized that government regulation,
if it is restrictive enough, can be considered a taking. Id. at 782. See Lucas v. S.
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (preventing construction on
beachfront property of any habitable structures considered a taking since the
"regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of the land");
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (designating a
building a historical landmark, thus preventing owner from constructing an expansion on top, is not considered a taking).
85 See infra Section 4.2. in text accompanying notes 92-116. As that discussion
makes clear, the fundamental goals of the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is not economic freedom but protecting the political, participatory interests
of out-of-state citizens from parochial in-state interests.
86 Other clauses in the Constitution place only insignificant limitations on
state regulation. Under the equal protection clause, U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1:
Unless a statute employs a classification that is inherently invidious or
that impinges on fundamental rights, areas in which the judiciary then
has a duty to intervene in the democratic process, this Court properly exercises only a limited review power over Congress, the appropriate representative body through which the public makes democratic choices
among alternative solutions to social and economic problems.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss1/1

2003]

TWO CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS OF THE WTO

37

Constitution embodies no general protection of efficiency values
and no particular view of how economic activity should be organized or regulated. 87 In a very real sense, the Constitution is agnostic on the organization of the economy. 88 In particular, after the
demise of Lochner, the Constitution is unavailable to police the democratic process against so-called special interests.8 9
Shweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981).
But the Supreme Court has been unwilling to scrutinize closely either the public purpose or the rationality of the classifications, invalidating "only that government choice which is 'clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment."' TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 164, at 997 (1st ed.
1978) (quoting Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976)). See City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (upholding exemption of two vendors from
regulation of businesses in French Quarter); Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348
U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding regulation of opticians that was not also applied to
sellers of ready-to-wear glasses); Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330
U.S. 552 (1947) (upholding apprenticeship requirement that effectively preserved
the business for relatives and friends). Another possible limitation on economic
regulation is the contracts clause, U.S. CONST. art. I § 10. See, e.g., Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (invalidating Minnesota pension legislation); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (invalidating legislation that relieved state of contractual obligation). However, these are the only two
cases since 1937 where the Supreme Court invalidated a law based on the contracts clause. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 76, at 495. See General Motors v. Romein,

503 U.S. 181 (1992) (rejecting challenge to changes imposed by state law in workers' compensation program); Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light,
459 U.S. 400 (1983) (upholding a Kansas law prohibiting natural gas producers
from raising prices, an entitlement under contracts with customers, based on rates
set by federal authorities).
87 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963) (stating that the
Supreme Court "emphatically refuse[s] to go back to the time when courts used
the Due Process Clause 'to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of line with
a particular school of thought") (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S.
483, 488 (1955)); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 CoLuM. L. REV. 873,
882 (1987) (suggesting the defect in Lochner is, among other things, the assumption
of market ordering under the common law as the base line against which to test
legislation).
88 See COOTER, supra note 73, at 282 ("[Tjhe new understanding of the U.S.
Constitution allows different ideals to contend for political power.").
89 Cass Sunstein has pointed out that in Lochner:
[The] Court appeared to be referring to what we may call 'raw' interestgroup transfers [when it referred to the impermissible ends of legislation]. Because the only available public justifications were insufficient,
the minimum wage statute was invalidated as an interest-group deal, reflecting nothing other than political power.
Sunstein, supra note 87, at 878. By implication, the demise of Lochner means that
ends such as so-called rent transfers are no longer subject to a constitutional judicial remedy. Since the demise of Lochner, the Supreme Court has upheld legisla-
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The reason for that is not difficult to see. Undoubtedly, economic efficiency is an important value, and we are not surprised
that considerations of economic efficiency pervasively animate
public policy. But that does not mean that the majority of voters
are bound (by either the Constitution or by good sense) to choose
efficient policies. As has already been argued, voters have many
reasons to favor non-efficiency values over efficiency values. It is
therefore wrong to assume that what is best for the majority of

people in an economic or efficiency sense will be reflected in democratically determined policy, and it is wrong to equate democratic choice with economic efficiency. Statements to the effect that
"protectionist groups pose serious obstacles for democracy at
home" 90 or that "protectionist groups frustrate democracy" 91 present a deeply flawed view of democracy and the relationship of efficiency values to public policy.
4.2. The External,ParticipatoryVision Reflects Principlesof
Federalism and Commerce Clause Jurisprudence;The Internal,
Economic Vision Does Not
As we have seen, the internal, economic vision of the legitimacy of the WTO is sometimes supported on constitutional
grounds by arguing that the WTO performs a role similar to the
role played by dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 92 This
tion that is pretty clearly protectionist and passed at the behest of "special interests." See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 483 (restricting practice of opticians in favor of
optometrists and ophthalmologists); Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 144 (upholding
protectionist legislation under the guise of a health measure). For analyses of the
protectionist impulses behind the Carolene Products legislation, see NEIL K.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS,

AND PUBLIC POLICY 68 n.31 (1994) and Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carotene
Products, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 397 (1987).
90 See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 35, at 526.

91Id. at 528.
92 See supra text accompanying note 35. The thought has been expressed as
follows:

In promoting both free trade and accountable democratic government,
the WTO reflects many of the principles that inform federalism-the
keystone of our own Constitution. One effect of our original federal
structure was to prevent discrimination against interstate trade and thus
restrain protectionist interest groups. This free trade regime, in conjunction with an open national capital market, also restrained special interests more broadly, making it more difficult for them to exact resources
from state governments. In this way federalism reinforced the power of
majorities within states while promoting a continental economy. Our
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view is mistaken; it misinterprets the dormant Commerce Clause
and gets the relationship between the WTO and dormant Commerce Clause principles exactly backwards. In fact, because the
dormant Commerce Clause was designed to protect out of state
citizens, not to protect against political capture by factions within a
state, the correct understanding of the dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence supports the external, participatory vision of the
WTO-external control is necessary because state (or national)
lawmaking may be parochial in the sense that it undervalues the
impact of policy on those not in the jurisdiction. The dormant
Commerce Clause performs in a federal system the same function
that the WTO performs in the international system-to make it
harder for lawmaking sovereigns to devalue or ignore the effect of
policy on others.
The modern approach of the Supreme Court to state regulatory
laws affecting interstate commerce 93 is a two-part test centered on
the discriminatory nature of the law.94 According to the Court:
"When a state statute clearly discriminates against interstate commerce, it will be struck down ... unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism."9 5 Indeed, if the state statute "amounts to simple
domestic trade constitution thus achieved the goals James Madison set
out for constitutionalism in general: '[t]o secure the public good and private rights against the danger of... factions, and at the same time preserve the spirit and the form or popular government....'
McGinnis & Movsesian, supranote 35, at 514 (footnotes omitted).
93 State taxation of interstate commerce is subjected to a different, although
analogous, test. See CHEMERINSKY, supranote 76, at 338-50.
94 Id. at 316. The dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is coming under
increasing fire from commentators and members of the bench in the context of reducing the power of the federal government. See Patrick C. McGinley, Trashing
the Constitution:Judicial Activism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Federalism
Mantra, 71 OR. L. REv. 409, 420 (1992) ("In the absence of specific constitutional
authorization or delegation, use of the dormant Commerce Clause to overturn
state legislative action similarly seems 'an unconstitutional assumption of powers
by courts of the United States."') (quoting Erie R.R. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79
(1938)). According to Justice Thomas, "The negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application." Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). None of these
questions about the dormant Commerce Clause have yet been found to be persuasive. See TRIBE, supra note 76, § 6-2, at 1030-43.
95 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992). See TRIBE, supra note 76, §
6-3 (discussing the breadth of the Court's definition of 'discrimination' as applicable to businesses, users, and products); Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free
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economic protectionism, a 'virtually per se rule of invalidity'" applies.96 On the other hand, if the state statute treats in-state citizens
and out-of-state citizens alike, the court balances the state's legitimate interest against the burden on interstate commerce. 97 The
state statute "will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."

98

Under this jurisprudence, the dormant Commerce Clause
clearly protects out-of-state interests from the parochialism of instate lawmakers, and forces state lawmakers to consider the effect
of their policies on out-of-state interests. As a result, the external,
participatory vision of the WTO is the international counterpart to
the "process based" or "representational" theories that permeate
modern dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 99 As Justice
Stone explained:
Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT's Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause,
47 VAND. L. REv. 1401, 1414 (1994) (referring to the term "discrimination" as
"hardly self explanatory, and the courts have not developed a clear test"). See
generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 72, at 317-22 (discussing what constitutes discrimination, when legislation is discriminatory on its face or facially neutral).
96 Oklahoma, 502 U.S. at 454 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S.
617, 624 (1978)).
97 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,142 (1970).
98 Id.

99 In dormant Commerce Clause literature, the external, participatory vision
is often referred to as "process-based" theory or "representation" theory. See generally Julian. N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425,
443 (1982) (arguing the only "justification for judicial displacement of state legislative judgments in the commercial area" is "the process-oriented protection of representational government"). However, Eule goes on to argue that such review
should be conducted under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of
the Constitution. Id. See also TRIBE, supra note 76, § 6-5 (discussing the theme of
political representation in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence). Tribe notes
that cases striking down state statutes rarely articulate this process-based rationale, but that the rationale "should be seen as underlying the forms of economic
discrimination which the Supreme Court has treated as invalidating certain state
actions with respect to interstate commerce." Id. § 6-5, at 1057. Sometimes, the
process-based rationale is expressed in economic terms: "the theory 'can be
viewed as a political application of the economists' theory of externalities: because
a legislative body may underestimate the burdens that its proposals place on people who do not participate in its selection, the resulting statutes may be inefficient.'" Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV.
125, 128 n.14 (1979). The process-based theory is not without its critics. See Steven
Breker-Cooper, The Commerce Clause: The Case for Judicial Non-Intervention, 69 Or.
L. Rev. 895, 911.

Whatever the merits of process theory, in the commerce clause area it is
certain that its most thorough developers do not wholeheartedly believe
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Underlying the stated rule has been the thought, often expressed in judicial opinions, that when the regulation is of
such a character that its burden falls principally upon those
without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state.100
This external, participatory rationale for the dormant Commerce Clause 01 is also reflected in the two exceptional instances in
which states are permitted to discriminate against or burden interstate commerce. 102 The first exception allows a state to burden interstate commerce when Congress has approved that action. "If
Congress ordains that the States may freely regulate an aspect of
interstate commerce, any action taken by a State within the scope
of the congressional authorization is rendered invulnerable to
Commerce Clause challenge." 103 Under this exception, when Congressional legislation allows states to pass parochial legislation,
out-of-state citizens are not foreclosed from participation because
they can challenge the law in Congress. As a result, their right to
participate is vindicated, and the dormant Commerce Clause need
not be invoked to protect their rights.
The second exception, the "market-participant" exception, allows a state to favor its own citizens vis-A-vis out-of-state citizens
when a government-owned business is involved or when a busiin their own approaches. Each requires that process theory do more than
protect the political process. Indeed, each requires that certain substantive results be achieved. This reflects a fundamental misconception of
the nature of process inquiry and a distrust of its results.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
100 S.C. Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938); see
also S. Pac. Co. v. State of Ariz. ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767 n.2 (1944).
101 "The political process rationale for invoking the dormant Conmerce
Clause is consistent with the Court's bifurcated analytical approach to examining
state laws." Russell Korobkin, The Local Politics of Acid Rain: Public Versus Private
Decisionmakingand the Dormant Commerce Clause in a New Era of Environmental Law,
75 B.U. L. REV. 689, 750 (1995).
102 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 76, at 333.
103 W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648, 65253 (1981). Naturally, even when Congress expressly or impliedly authorizes the
action, the state law [or federal law] will still be subject to constitutional challenges on equal protection, privileges and immunities, or other constitutional
grounds. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 76, at 334.
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ness receives benefits from a government program.104 The Court's
justification for the market-participant exception is one of original
intent: the framers gave "no indication of a constitutional plan to
limit the ability of the States themselves to operate freely in the free
market."105 However, in a plurality opinion, the Court held that a
State cannot "impose conditions, whether by statute, regulation, or
contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that
particular market." 06 This market-participant exception is also
consistent with the external, participatory view because the burdens of market participation are felt by in-state taxpayers who are
likely to represent out-of-state interests. 107 Again, the purpose of
the dormant Commerce Clause is fulfilled.

supra note 76, at 336.
105Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 (1980). See generally TRIBE, supra
note 76, § 6-11 (discussing market-participant doctrine). Commentators, of
course, have offered others. Benjamin C. Bair argues that only two of several justifications for the market-participant exception are bona fide: (1) " [Plreferring residents when spending their money is a legitimate state objective as a matter of
moral and political theory;" and (2) "[P]references that require the expenditure of
state funds have built-in restraints that may make them less politically and economically divisive than other discriminatory state laws." Benjamin C. Bair, The
Dormant Commerce Clause and State-Mandated Preference Laws in Public Contracting:
Developing a More Substantive Application of the Market-ParticipantException, 93
MICH. L. REV. 2408, 2420 (1995). Bair reasons that under justification (2), the
higher cost (as compared to discriminatory taxes and tariffs) of contractual preferences is likely to limit the scope of the measure. Id. at 2422. Also, contractual
preferences are less likely to engender retaliation from other states because those
states may recognize justification (1). For a discussion of several other justifications, see id. at 2420-25. Another justification analogizes the state as a participant
to a private enterpriser reasoning that the state as a participant should have all the
freedom of a private actor. See Michael J. Polelle, A Critique of the MarketParticipantException, 15 WHITIER L. REV. 647, 661-64 (1994) (disagreeing with the
soundness of the analogy's rationale and arguing that original intent cannot serve
as a justification for the market participation exception).
106 South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97 (1984)
(White, J.,) (plurality decision). Polelle suggests there is another restriction on the
market-participant exception implicit in Reeves that government marketing of its
natural resources is subject to the balancing test. See Polelle, supra note 105, at 672.
As with the first exception, laws falling under the "market-participant" exception
are still subject to other constitutional challenges. CiEMERINSKY, supra note 76, at
336.
107 See Stanley E. Cox, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Court Confusion About the Dormant Commerce Clause, 50 OKLA. L. REv. 155 (1997).
104 CHEMERINKSY,

In situations where the state merely regulates to accomplish an arguably
legitimate local purpose, there is not necessarily any direct cost to the
state's citizenry. The dormant Commerce Clause accordingly steps in to
make sure the state regulation is not primarily taxing outsiders for in-
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Further demonstrating the pervasiveness of the external, participatory vision in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the

Court has upheld severe burdens on interstate commerce in other
instances where in-state interests have provided "surrogate" representation.109 The "surrogate" representation theory suggests that
in cases where in-state interests adequately represent out-of-state

interests, the state regulation complies with the dormant Commerce Clause precisely because out-of-state interests are adequately represented. 0 9 In short, however the analysis is phrased,
sider benefit. But when general revenue public funds must be expended
on a project, the citizens are acting directly at their own cost.
Id. at 203. See Korobkin, supra note 101, at 753-57 (stating that the difference between hurting out-of-state producers and subsidizing local producers is that a
subsidy is less likely to be hidden to in-state citizens than the costs of a regulation.
Therefore, it is reasonable that the subsidy will be challenged in the legislature,
since the costs are more apparent and the state's limited funds mean other public
programs seeking funds are at risk). Therefore, in-state consumers can virtually
represent the out-of-state producers in the political process. Id. at 755-56.
108 TRIBE, supra note 76, § 6-5, at 1053 (noting S.C. State Highway Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938)). The presumption does not exist,
however, when the state statute effects only out-of-state interests. Id. at 1053 (noting Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981)).
109 "Nondiscriminatory measures, like the evenhanded tax at issue here, are
generally upheld, in spite of any adverse effects on interstate commerce, in part
because 'the existence of major in-state interests adversely affected... is a powerful safeguard against legislative abuse.'" W. Lynn Creamery, Inc., v. Healy, 512
U.S. 186, 200 (1994) (quoting Minn. v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473,
a regulation burdens both in-state interests and out-of-state inn.17 (1981)). "[I]f
terests, it is not troubling from a process-reinforcement perspective because the
out-of-staters are assumed to be 'virtually represented' by the similarly situated
locals, who provide political insurance against unreasonable regulation." Korobkin, supra note 101, at 749 (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 83-84,
90-91 (1980)). See Cox, supra note 107, at 172-75 (arguing the effects of Fort Gratiot
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992), effectively eliminate the rationale from cases where the state statute is discriminatory).
Although it may be suggested that consumers can represent out-of-state interests,
there are several reasons consumers are insufficient. First, consumers may be altruistic. "Consumers may forego lower prices and support state legislation engineered to hamstring out-of-state competitors in the interest of protecting local jobs
and local ways of life, as well as local tax revenues, from streamlining effects of
competition." TRIBE, supra note 76, § 6-5, at 1055. Also, if consumers were adequate, the Articles of Confederation may still be around since there would be no
need for restricting protectionism. Id. But cf. Korobkin, supra note 101, at 752-53
(claiming process-reinforcement theory has one substantial flaw - its failure to
consider the consumer as a possible surrogate in the political process). Public
choice theory offers one justification as to why consumers are not adequatediffuse consumers are ineffective as compared to discrete minorities. Korobkin
goes on to suggest that this entails the court should apply scrutiny when any legislation affects a majority at the benefit of the minority, and therefore returns Con-
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the jurisprudence of the dormant Commerce Clause supports the
constitutional underpinnings of the external, participatory vision.110
stitutional doctrine to the Lochner era. Id. As an alternative, Korobkin suggests
that the difference when "regulations harm local consumers but not when they
harm local producers is that the costs to consumers of such regulations are disguised, making consumers unlikely to exercise fully the political power they do
possess." Id. at 753). Cf. Cox, supra note 106, at 205 (explaining the marketparticipant exception where in-state citizens' interests are more than those of mere
consumers). "The citizens whose funds are being expended are like the shareholders of a corporation who can vote the management out when their investment
is not being properly managed. But the criteria by which citizens decide what is
good or bad public investment is not solely economic." Id.
110 Other analyses of the dormant Commerce Clause are not inconsistent with
this conclusion. Historically, a justification for the dormant Commerce Clause has
been that one state's protectionist measure would trigger retaliatory protectionist
measures from another state, leading to political disunion. CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 76, at 309. The continued validity of the justification under modem circumstances has been challenged. See Eule, supra note 99, at 435. Even were it valid,
the justification assumes the external, participatory vision. The retaliating states
are forced to pass protectionist measures, because without political representation
in the offending state they have no other recourse for protecting their citizens.
Mark Tushnet has suggested that the retaliating state can subsidize the lobbying
efforts of the offending state's consumers and utilize consumer advocate groups
within the state. Mark V. Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions
of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980). This, however,
incorrectly assumes that the state legislation will not be in the interests of consumers in that state. As is noted in the text, it confuses state protectionist interests
with special interests. Moreover, to the extent that out-of-state interests can be
protected through in-state surrogates, analysis under the dormant Commerce
Clause will less intrusively impinge on state legislation. In his own analytical
framework for thinking about the problem presented in dormant Commerce
Clause cases, Donald H. Regan distinguishes between a protectionist test and a
balancing test, endorsing the former and rejecting the latter. Donald H. Regan,
Judicial Review of Member-State Regulation of Trade Within a Federal or Quasi-Federal
System: Protectionismand Balancing, Da Capo, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1853, 1856 (2001).
He rejects the balancing test because, within his framework, it applies only when
the legislation is not protectionist, and, within his framework, that occurs when
interests inside a state adequately represent out-of-state interests. Under those
circumstances there is nothing to balance. Id. at 1860. He seems to reject the participatory model of vision two (what he refers to as the "virtual representation"
argument). Id. at 1854. But, he admits that the protectionist test can be viewed as
a way of preventing failures of the political process in the treatment of local interests, to the indirect benefit of foreign producers. Id. at 1878 n.37. Professor
Regan's analysis differs from the analysis here because it is confined to efficiency
analysis, and therefore seems to assume that voters are motivated only by their
own economic welfare. That analysis makes the mistake of assuming that voters
may not be altruistic, a mistake refuted above. See supra text accompanying notes
57-75. Once that assumption is relaxed, Regan can no longer conclude that all
protectionist legislation is also the result of capture by special interests, or that the
anti-protectionist test is all that is needed to support the values of the dormant
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The claim that the internal, economic vision supporting the
WTO is somehow aligned with the constitutional purposes of the
dormant Commerce Clause, which is based on the suggestion that
the clause restricts special interest groups and thereby fosters free
trade and democracy, mistakes the effect of the dormant Commerce
Clause with its purpose. There is no doubt that the dormant Commerce Clause prevents some measures that have been sought and
secured by special interest groups (and that are therefore adverse
to the general interests of the people inside the state as well as
people outside the state). But this is only the effect of the dormant
Commerce Clause. As I have just shown, the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause is to protect out-of-state citizens, and the
protection of in-state citizens against special interest groups is only
incidental to that purpose. The confusion is caused by the broad
and undisciplined use of the term "protectionist" in connection
with both international trade restrictions and state legislation. The
protectionist state legislation that the dormant Commerce Clause
seeks to address is that which advances the interests of people
within a state over the interests of people outside the state, not the
legislation that seeks to protect one class of people within a state
from the "special interests" of others within a state.
The Commerce Clause does not establish either free trade or a
national market as a constitutional value. 1 ' If it did, there would

Commerce Clause. Because a state may be protectionist without giving in to special interests, the dormant Commerce Clause test must be fashioned to protect foreigners when protection is in the general interest of the citizens of the state. For
criticism of Donald Regan's earlier work, see Breker-Cooper, supra note 98, 907-10
(concluding that Regan fails to account for the fact that the Court claims to be
doing more than preventing purposeful state protectionism). Professors Goldsmith and Sykes argue that the process rationale sweeps too broadly, and therefore suggest that a unification of process and efficiency rationales is consistent
with the pertinent case law. Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L. J. 785, 795-96 (2001).
ill Eule, supra note 99, at 434. Eule admits that the free trade idea is often expressed in Supreme Court opinions, but reasons that such a notion is merely a result of its true purpose -the pressing need of preventing political disunion. Id. at
434-35. See Cox, supra note 107, at 215 (arguing that lower federal courts are misreading "the basic purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause as being to protect
business interests per se rather than to prevent discrimination against outside interests. Such return to Lochner-style constitutional valuing of private economic
rights is not warranted under the dormant Commerce Clause"). "The function of
the clause is to ensure national solidarity, not necessarily economic efficiency."
TRIBE, supra note 76, § 6-5, at 1057. "Although the Court's Commerce Clause opinions have freely employed the language of economics, the decisions have not interpreted the Constitution as establishing the inviolability of the free market." Id.
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be no market-participant exception under dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, because when a state acts as a marketparticipant to the detriment of out-of-state interests, its actions are
lawful even though they decrease the economy's efficiency. 112
In summary, the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
fully supports the federalism and democratic impulses underlying
the external, participatory vision of the WTO. As social problems
and social opportunities move from local to regional to internaat 1058. "We cannot, however, accept appellants' underlying notion that the
Commerce Clause protects the particular structure or methods of operation in a
retail market." Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978).
Cf. Farber & Hudec, supra note 95, at 1407 ("Process and substance are closely intertwined, however, in the area of free trade. Free trade is a substantively valuable goal, but receives legal protection because of process issues, while such protection is feasible, in part, because free trade provides tribunals with a substantive
baseline."). Farber & Hudec go on to argue that both should play a role in the
analysis. Id. "[11n the context of other trade-oriented instruments, the DCC seems
less like an anomalous development of U.S. legal history, and more like a necessary and reasonable inference form the overall constitutional scheme of political
and economic union. Id. at 1408. See Korobkin, supranote 101, at 748-49.
If Congress believes free trade is sound economic policy or desires to encourage neighborliness among the states, it has the power to preempt
any state law that interferes with commerce in the slightest degree. This
grant of power to Congress obviates any need for the courts to protect
these values proactively.... Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce in the name of free trade, political comity, or any other majoritarian value makes it unnecessary and redundant for courts to make substantive policy choices for or against protectionist state laws. In contrast,
this grant of substantive power to the majoritarian branch does not render the institutional ability of courts to protect the interests of unrepresented or underrepresented groups any less important.
Id. Cf. McGinley, supra note 94, at 452-53:
The Commerce Clause, then, is used as a device to export both environmental and political problems to neighboring states all in the name of
free-trade rights of trash generators, collectors, haulers, and disposers.
One must wonder whether the framers could have envisioned such a use
of the commerce power they delegated solely to Congress.
Id. (commenting on Phila. v. N.J., 437 U.S. 617 (1978)).
112 Indeed, "[t]he main criticism offered against market-participant exemption is that when the state acts in a market, it almost never acts like a regular participant, but instead usually skews free market forces, thereby destroying competition." Cox, supra note 107, at 202. "Ironically, the Court in Alexandria Scrap
[where the Court introduced market-participant doctrine] extols in principle the
virtues of free trade that inform the Commerce Clause, but then proceeds to develop a theory of subsidies thoroughly at odds with the ideological godfather of
the market system." Polelle, supra note 105, at 663. Similarly, the Congressional
legislation exception and the rule's allowance for states to exercise their police
powers hurt national economic efficiency but are not prohibited.
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tional arenas, the development of federalist structures to address
those problems and opportunities is not only natural, it is also desirable. Without those federal structures, the lawgivers will revert
to forms of parochialism that naturally exclude the voices of those
who are affected by the policy.1 3 Moreover, the democratic impulses behind federalism, and thus behind the external, participatory vision of the WTO, are straightforward. "[A] decision can be
called democratic if those affected by the decision were the participants in the decision-making process.... Accordingly those who
have to comply with the decision -or in other words: who are
governed by it-have to be the decision-makers." 1 4 Where, however, those affected by a decision are outside the territorial
boundaries of the lawmaking unit, the notion of democracy is
strained, for their views are not necessarily included when the decision is made. The democratic, representational legitimacy of the
WTO lies in the ability of the WTO to increase participation in the political process by those foreign interests that would otherwise be shut
out of it,"1 just as the dormant Commerce Clause protects out-ofstate citizens from state parochialism.
This analysis does not assert that the WTO members have always struck the correct balance when determining which powers
113 Although the Federalist Papers were concerned primarily with the advantages of union, they spoke also of the need to combat the parochialism of the
states of the confederacy. See THE FEDERALIST No. 6:

[Tihe subdivisions into which [the states] might be thrown would have
frequent and violent contests with each other .... To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties, situated in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the
uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated
experience of ages.
THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at 21-22 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books, 1992);
THE FEDERALIST No. 7 ("The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful
source of contention."); THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 102 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books, 1992) ("It is indeed evident, on the most superficial view, that there
is no object, either as it respects the interests of trade or finance that more strongly
demands a Federal superintendence.") (In context, the writer seems to be talking
about the possibility of war, but does not exclude economic warfare.). See also THE
FEDERALIST No. 45, at 232 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books, 1992) (referring to
"security against contentions and wars among the different States").
114 Krajewski, supra note 2, at 171-72 (citing DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL
ORDER, supra note 16, at 147).
115 McGinnis & Movsesian recognize that "foreign producers, the interest
group that would naturally benefit most from reduced domestic barriers, are not
represented in the polity." McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 35, at 527.
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will be delegated to the collective and which will be retained by
individual states. The balance between central and decentralized
lawmaking will always be difficult; in any federal system it will be
subject to sharp and detailed debate. The point of the analysis is
that the existence of an international body like the WTO to curb
parochialism and police external lawmaking is legitimate because
it is in the best tradition of federalist principles. Those principles
advance important interests of giving voice and participation to
those who would otherwise be unable to influence policymaking.
This is an important source of legitimacy for the WTO.
4.3. The External, ParticipatoryVision Supports Sovereignty; The
Internal, Economic Vision Subverts It
Both the internal, economic vision and the external, participatory vision of the WTO appeal for support to concepts of sovereignty and seek to repel the criticism that the WTO acts as an unwarranted encroachment on national sovereignty. However, the
internal, economic vision is incompatible with any meaningful
concept of sovereignty, while the external, participatory vision
fully supports effective national sovereignty in an interconnected
world.16
Sovereignty, of course, is neither a one-dimensional nor an
immutable concept. 117 The "contemporary surfeit of definitions" 118

116 One frequently made argument is that when a country accepts the obligations of the WTO, that acceptance is an exercise of sovereignty, rather than an invasion of, or reduction in, sovereignty. I do not endorse the view that we should
accept the legitimacy of the WTO simply because that work is the product of sovereigns, for much the same reason that we should not support the legitimacy of
the WTO on the basis of consent. See discussion and text infra, accompanying note
12. The WTO obligations are binding, and countries incur a cost for violating
them. Moreover, although each country engaged in an act of sovereignty when it
agreed to be bound by interpretations of the treaty obligations by the independent
and autonomous organs of the dispute resolution system -the panels and Appellate Body -states have, by subjecting themselves to this independent interpretive
force, given up some internal sovereignty. The argument developed here is rather
that a state must give up some forms of sovereignty to make its sovereign power
effective.

117 RICHARD FALK, ON HUMANE GOVERNANCE, TOWARD A NEW GLOBAL POLITICS

79-103 (1995) (emphasizing the variegated and transforming nature of sovereignty).
118 Daniel Philpott, Usurping the Sovereignty of Sovereignty?, 53 WORLD POL.
297, 300 (2001) (describing several definitions of sovereignty). Many of the definitions are discussed in STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY
43-72 (1999).
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of the term sovereignty makes any discussion of the term depend
on the definition of sovereignty that the analyst uses. Even with
the wide range of sovereignty definitions, however, the internal,
economic vision of the WTO cannot be squared with notions of
sovereignty. It has been argued that sovereignty is closely aligned
with democracy and that the WTO's ability to combat special interests supports a state's sovereignty by supporting its democracy.119 The assault on sovereignty that is perpetuated by this rendition of the internal, economic vision of the WTO is apparent. In
particular, it is wrong to assume that sovereignty is designed to
provide a particular outcome (namely, those policies that are
thought to maximize efficiency or wealth), just as it was wrong to
assume that democracy implies that particular policies will be followed. To equate sovereignty with a particular outcome is to subvert the central concept of sovereignty-the freedom to chooseand to replace it with a judgment about whether the nation
reached a predetermined outcome. This line of analysis undercuts
the very notion of sovereignty, which is to preserve the right of a
people to choose the outcomes that they think are best for them, including the desire to forego wealth in order to achieve other values. Far from supporting sovereignty, the argument that the WTO
helps bind the hands of the people so that they avoid unwise policy is, in fact, an attack on sovereignty.
How then are we to understand the WTO as anything other
than an encroachment on national sovereignty, especially in response to the many analysts who believe that because the WTO
binds national action it also binds national sovereignty? In particular, how does the external, participatory vision square with notions
of sovereignty? Clarity can be brought to the matter if we keep in
mind the distinction between formal sovereignty and effective sov-

119 Thus, McGinnis & Movsesian write:
The fact that protectionist groups frustrate democracy as well as free
trade casts doubt on the conventional wisdom that international trade
regimes like the WTO pose a threat to representative government in
member states ....
An international body that acts to restrain protectionist groups can both promote free trade and help domestic majorities
to achieve their goals. The WTO's potential to improve domestic democracy also belies another frequent criticism, namely that the organization
inevitably will encroach on members' sovereignty.
McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 35, at 528.
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ereignty,120 a distinction that is at the core of the diverse sovereignty literature. Once we understand this distinction, we understand the relationship between the concept of sovereignty, the interests that sovereignty protects, and the external, participatory
vision of the WTO.
Formal sovereignty is the right of a nation to make policy
within its territorial jurisdiction without interference from outside
political forces. It is the right to be let alone by other nations and
by international institutions. 121 An example of formal sovereignty
is the right of a nation to withdraw from the WTO -a right that is
unilateral and unfettered by formal or informal institutional constraints from other countries or from the WTO itself. Effective sovereignty, on the other hand, is a form of autonomy 22 - the ability
to control policy and welfare within a country without being hampered by the decisions made in other nations or by international
institutions. Again, the decision to withdraw from the WTO provides an example. A member deciding to withdraw from the WTO
has minimal effective sovereignty; the economic consequences of
withdrawal make withdrawal an unpalatable, and therefore
unlikely, policy option. Effective sovereignty is the ability to control one's fate by making policy that is not contingent on the decisions made by those not within the sovereign's jurisdiction.
The difference between formal and effective sovereignty could
not be starker. Formal sovereignty is the right to be let alone; effective sovereignty is the right to control one's circumstances, which
might include the ability to affect the behavior of individuals or nations outside of one's jurisdiction. Formal sovereignty is defensive;
effective sovereignty if offensive. Formal sovereignty is the right
to be independent; effective sovereignty is the ability to make independence work for a sovereign people.

120 The distinction between formal and effective sovereignty is similar to the
distinction between sovereignty and autonomy made by David Held in
DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 16, at 99-102. The distinction is
sometimes also seen as a distinction between internal and external sovereignty,
although that distinction performs other functions as well.
121 See, e.g., JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATrERS 2 (1998) ("Sovereignty
denotes independence. A sovereign state is one that acknowledges no superior
power over its own government ... ").
122 Cf. DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 16, at 100 (stating that
autonomy is the "capacity of state managers and agencies to pursue their policy
preferences without resort to forms of international collaboration or cooperation").
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The interplay between formal and effective sovereignty is a
unifying theme that helps to synthesize the diverse perspectives of
the sovereignty literature. One perspective, perhaps the dominant
one, decries the loss of sovereignty, and the powerlessness of the
state, in the face of transborder phenomena. 2 3 This strand is most
often aligned against globalization, global forces, and global institutions. It points to the limited space states have to maneuver in response to global forces. As applied to the WTO, this perspective often condemns the WTO for unleashing the economic forces that limit
national sovereignty. 124
This literature is perched on top of the notion of effective sovereignty because the literature rests on the assumption-implicit or explicit - that nations will underregulate transnational phenomena,
particularly
economic phenomena. Under this view, sovereignty is
"at bay" 25 precisely because the regulatory powers of the modem
state are too weak in the face of global capital and global communications. Under this view, sovereigns have under-inclusive lawmaking
power because the phenomena they are regulating are inherently
transborder and because people or companies will undercut any attempt to regulate their conduct by moving or threatening to move.
From this perspective, global forces make effective sovereignty impossible while also reducing formal sovereignty.
A second strand of the sovereignty literature, the antisovereignty genre, sees sovereignty as an obstacle to achieving cer-

123 See RICHARD N. COOPER, THE ECONOMICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE: ECONOMIC
POLICY IN THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY (1968); FALK, supra note 117, at 104 (emphasiz-

ing pressures to promote competitiveness at the expense of welfare and environmental protection); id. at 79 (discussing the displacement of the state); KENICHI
OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMICS (1995);
RABKIN, supra note 121, at 42 (pointing out the dangers of the growing influence of
transnational non-governmental organizations); WALTER B. WRISTON, THE
TWILIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY: How THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION Is TRANSFORMING
OUR WORLD (1992).
124 See, e.g., FALK, supra note 117, at 131 (noting that GATT is an indicator of

deepening globalization).
125 RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF

U.S. ENTERPRISES (1971). He revisited the same theme in RAYMOND VERNON, IN THE
HURRICANE'S EYE: THE TROUBLED PROSPECTS OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1998).

The notion that globalization makes governance more difficult comes on top of a
literature that questioned the ability of governments to govern in the face of the
scientific and informational character of modern society, even apart from globalization. See Nico Stehr & Richard V. Ericson, The Ungovernability of Modern Societies: States, Democracies,Markets, Participation,and Citizens, in GOVERNING MODERN
SOCIETIES 3 (Richard V. Ericson & Nico Stehr eds., 2000).
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tain public goods, such as universal human rights.126 From the antisovereignty perspective, sovereignty is a misplaced shield that perpetuates offensive national policies. This literature also endorses the
distinction between formal sovereignty and effective sovereignty because it is built on the universality of the norms that are sought to be
imposed on another nation. Its assumption is that the conduct of
people in one state is so offensive to the welfare of people in another
state - precisely because it violates universal norms - that it reduces

their welfare and therefore the effectiveness of their sovereignty.
Here, the argument is that the formal sovereignty of one nation must
give way because the effective sovereignty of other nations -and in
particular their allegiance to certain universal norms-would otherwise be undermined. Whereas the loss of sovereignty literature sees
the loss of effective sovereignty, even though formal sovereignty is
retained, the anti-sovereignty literature would limit the formal sovereignty of one nation in order to increase the effective sovereignty of
another nation.
A third genre of the sovereignty literature argues that sovereignty has never been as widespread or respected as people have believed; that in fact sovereignty is, in the words of one prominent analyst, only "organized hypocrisy." 127 Here, analysts ask whether the
idea of sovereignty has ever had the traction that is commonly attached to it. Analysts here also ground their analysis in the distinction between formal and effective sovereignty. By pointing out the
exceptions to the sovereignty norm-instances in which one nation
has disregarded the formal sovereignty of another nation - this literature shows that respect for formal sovereignty has often given way
where another nation's interests (i.e., effective sovereignty) are at
stake. This literature is built on instances in which one country felt
that in order to protect its effective sovereignty -its ability to choose

126 See, e.g., Jarat Chopra & Thomas G. Weiss, Sovereignty is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying HumanitarianIntervention, 6 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 95 (1992); Gene M.
Lyons & Michael Mastanduno, Introduction: International Intervention, State Sovereignty, and the Future of International Society, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995) [hereinafter BEYOND WESTPHALIA?]; Gene M. Lyons & Michael
Mastanduno, State Sovereignty and InternationalIntervention: Reflections on the Present and Prospectsfor the Future,in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?, at 250.
127 KRASNER, supra note 122; See MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK,

LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE
CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 2 (1995) (quoting Krasner's statement that the term sov-

ereignty has "lost meaning and analytical relevance").
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the policy that is best for it-the nation had to challenge, and sometimes even infringe, the formal sovereignty of another nation.
The importance of distinguishing between formal and effective
sovereignty arises from the interdependence of national policy.
Historically, the analysis of sovereignty did not require the analyst
to make a distinction between formal and effective sovereignty because the problems being addressed were local, not transnational.
As long as the subject matter being regulated is confined to a specified territory, formal sovereignty is effective sovereignty. When
political boundaries match the problem being addressed, formal
sovereignty gives a nation the right to control what happens within
its territory, and the nation has formal sovereignty because neither
its own policy decisions nor those of other nations have an extraterritorial effect. The nation is therefore free to make the decision
that they believe to be correct for them. It is only when political
boundaries and policymaking boundaries diverge that formal and
effective sovereignty diverge-for then the decision made in one
nation has an impact on the decisions made in another nation, and
policymaking becomes interdependent.
As nations have become more interconnected, however, the divergence between formal sovereignty and effective sovereignty has
grown significantly. What the diverse perspectives of the sovereignty literature have in common is the implicit acknowledgement
that policy decisions in one nation have an impact on the welfare of
people in other nations-the same premise that underlies the external, participatory vision. In other words, each viewpoint of the
scholarly debate about sovereignty is based on the same understanding-that sovereignty over internal affairs-that is, the power to order one's society to reflect the preferences of the members of the society- cannot be sustained unless there is a measure of sovereignty that is power to influence-the policy adopted in other nations and
social orders.
The divergence between formal and effective sovereignty leads
to the paradox of sovereignty-and to the "new" sovereignty that
is at the core of the work of Abram and Antonia Chayes. 128 That
paradox is that in an interconnected world, a nation, in order to
preserve effective sovereignty, must give up some forms of its for-

128 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).'
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mal sovereignty. 29 That explains why even powerful countries
must support international cooperation when they seek to preserve
their policymaking autonomy in the interests of the welfare of their
people. 30 As the Chayes remind us, "For all but a few self-isolated
countries, sovereignty no longer consists in the freedom of states to
act independently, in their perceived self-interest, but in membership in good standing in the regimes that make up the substance of
international life." 131 To be a player, the state must submit to the
pressures that international institutions impose.
The new sovereignty is, in effect, the search for new forms of
democracy in an interconnected world and the search for international mechanisms for overcoming the parochial character of state
lawmaking. Again, David Held has best stated the dilemma of
sovereignty in the same context that he has explained the dilemma
of democracy:
In his important book on sovereignty and the modern state,
The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, Hendrik Spruyt concludes that the statist world of modernity arose out of an
organizational competition between states on the one side
and city-leagues and city-states on the other. The state won
out over these rivals for organizational preeminence in late
129 See FALK, supra note 14, at 33 ("Somewhat paradoxically, to retain primacy
they must give up many of its Westphalian attributes, especially those resting

upon the claims and practices of territorial sovereignty.").

See also JOSEPH A.

CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY?: THE POLITICS OF A SHRINKING AND

FRAGMENTING WORLD (1992).
130 See, e.g., JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER (2002). See
also Daniel W. Drezner, On the Balance Between International Law and Democratic
Sovereignty, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 321, 321 (2001) (stating that great powers can either
maximize their sovereign powers or sacrifice some degree of sovereignty "in the
hope of constructing a stable order through multilateral institutions").
131CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 128, at 27.
Sovereignty, in the end, is status -the vindication of the state's existence
as a member of the international system. In today's setting, the only way
most states can realize and express their sovereignty is through participation in the various regimes that regulate and order the international
system. Isolation from the persuasive and rich international context
means that the state's potential for economic growth and political influence will not be realized. Connection to the rest of the world and the political ability to be an actor within it are more important than any tangible benefits in explaining compliance with international regulatory
agreements.
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medieval Europe. According to Spruyt's well-argued and
documented appraisal, 'States won because their institutional logic gave them an advantage in mobilizing their societies' resources.' I think we are living at a time when
states are losing their organizational advantage in the provision of public goods, with the revealing exception of security, though only then if security is conceived in the nar132
rowly artificial terms of military/police activities.
The WTO serves to confer important effective sovereignty that
responds to the interdependence that is the foundation of the various theoretical perspectives about sovereignty. Without the WTO,
the "sovereignty" of nations would consist of responding as best
they can to the policies of other nations, a kind of sovereignty
without substance. 133 This form of "defensive" sovereignty which would basically be to make the best policy in light of what
other nations do -gives each nation the illusion of control over its
own affairs without giving the nation actual control over its own
affairs. The WTO restores potential effectiveness to each nation's
sovereignty - by giving each nation the opportunity to confront the
policies of foreign governments that it finds to be objectionable and
to bargain to have those objectionable policies changed.

5.

WTO JURISPRUDENCE FULLY REFLECTS THE EXTERNAL,
PARTICIPATORY VISION

WTO treaties constrain national autonomy. By themselves,
therefore, the WTO treaties are consistent with either vision discussed here -the WTO that constrains national policy to keep a nation from making mistakes in determining the best policy for its
own people or the WTO that constrains national policy to protect
foreigners. When we examine WTO jurisprudence, however, it is
clear that the second vision animates the content and interpretation

132 DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 16, at 41 (quoting HENDRIK
SPRUYT, THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS COMPETTORS (1994)).

133 Such sovereignty is not, of course, an academic matter. When the United
States recently increased subsidies to its farmers, it effectively took bread off the
table of farmers in poor countries, an inevitable result of the fact that U.S. legislators consider the well-being of U.S. consumers and farmers, but not the well-being
of foreign farmers. With the WTO, foreign farmers have an opportunity, through
their governments, to exercise their sovereignty and at least raise objections to
U.S. policy.
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of the WTO treaties. A central concern of WTO treaty provisions
and interpretive jurisprudence is the harm to foreigners and the
quality of the process given to foreigners-and not the quality of
the internal political process in member countries.
We see the external, participatory focus of WTO jurisprudence
in two situations: first, when a nation seeks to impose the costs of
its legitimate regulatory goals on foreigners; and second, where national policy might otherwise give inadequate consideration to the
views of foreigners.134
5.1. PolicingDisproportionateExternal Costs
In a large number of WTO disputes, a nation takes action to
protect an important GATT-consistent goal-for example, to protect the health or safety of its citizens or to form a lawful customs
union-and the nation imposes costs on foreigners as a part of its
action. In such cases, the WTO panels and Appellate Body reviewing the national action do not undertake any searching examination of the political process that led to the action to see whether the
process was captured by "special interests," as would be suggested
by the internal vision of the WTO. But the WTO adjudicatory bodies regularly examine the costs that the measures impose on foreigners and ask whether those costs should be borne by foreigners
or by those who benefit from achieving the policy goal -those who
live within the country. These interpretations, while not clearly
compelled by the language of the treaties (and thus not direct evidence of the understanding of the member countries), demonstrate

134 In addition, of course, WTO treaties guarantee the expectations of foreign
private parties to the rights provided by the treaty provisions. See, e.g., WTOReport of the Panel on India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R, para. 6.2 (Sept. 5, 1997), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org.

In establishing a mechanism that preserves novelty and priority in respect of applications for product patents in respect of pharmaceutical
and agricultural chemical inventions during the [TRIPS] transitional period, India should take into account the interests of those persons who
would have filed patent applications had an appropriate mechanism
been maintained....
Id. This decision was modified by the WTO Appellate Body Report on India Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 93, 96 (Dec. 17, 1997) (finding that the provision interpreted by the panel was not adequately challenged by the United States in its request for consultations), available at http://docsonline.wto.org.
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that, at least in the mind of those interpreting the WTO obligations,
it is the external, participatory vision that animates the WTO.
In the Korean BeefP35 case, for example, South Korea had
adopted measures to segregate the sale of imported and domestic
beef, purportedly to help avoid deceptive sales practices. Although the segregation of retail outlets was easily found to treat
foreign producers "less favorably" than domestic consumers, and
therefore to be a prima facie violation of the national treatment obligation, South Korea argued that the less favorable treatment was
permitted under the general defenses in Article XX. Some South
Korean meat merchants had been selling low-priced (imported)
beef as if it were high-priced (domestic) beef, a practice similar to
passing off that is acknowledged to be inimical to an efficient market.136 This kind of passing off was easier to police when the beef
was sold from segregated locations. The Appellate Body never
questioned the goal of prohibiting deceptive practices, for that is
indeed a legitimate goal of state action under Article XX (d) of
GATT. The issue in the case was whether South Korea's decision
to segregate the selling outlets was "necessary" to reach that goal
under Article XX (d).
Under the first, internal vision of the WTO, we might have expected the Appellate Body to examine whether protectionist forces
within South Korea had captured the political process and subverted the well-intentioned government apparatus for defining
and addressing deceptive practices. It might, for example, have
looked at the history of the measure to see whether its support
came from the domestic meat lobby (a potentially protectionist
force) or from consumer advocates 137 (a group that would have
135 WTO Appellate Body Report on Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of
Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11,
2000) [hereinafter Korean-Beef], availableat http://docsonline.wto.org.
136 See generally FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
LAw RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS (1925) (analyzing the state of trademark law in

relation to its history); William M. Landes & Richard Posner, Trademark Law: An
Economic Perspective, 30 J. L. & ECON. 265 (1987) (using economics to explain the

structure of trademark law); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267 (1988).
137 Of course, any such inquiry would have been perilous, not only because it
intrudes upon the lawmaking process of South Korea, but also because any evidence of the source and motivations of the measure are inherently ambiguous.
For example, if some unscrupulous merchants were selling low-value beef as if it
were high-value beef, one would expect that honest and competitive beef merchants would be the most likely to notice this and complain. This might be misinterpreted as protectionism when in fact it might simply be the self-interested pro-

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa.J. Int'l Econ. L.

[24:1

more interest in regulating deceptive practices). It might have then
asked whether consumer advocates were really shills for the domestic protectionist lobby. The Appellate Body did none of this; its
goal was not to police the political process in South Korea. Instead,
it sought to determine whether in addressing a legitimate goal
South Korea had unlawfully discriminated against foreigners; as it
turned out, that depended on the disproportionate impact of the
measure on foreigners.
Instead of looking inside the South Korean political process, the
Appellate Body looked to the external impact of the measure. The
Appellate Body undertook its analysis by considering who should
bear the cost of the measures to support South Korea's legitimate
goal of preventing deceptive practices-should it be those in South
Korea who benefit from the measure or should it be foreign producers. This issue was raised because South Korea claimed that
the separation of foreign and domestic beef outlets was the best,
and least costly, way of preventing deceptive practices. The alternative method -investing more resources in directly enforcing
rules against the deceptive practices-would have increased the
costs of reaching South Korea's goal of preventing deceptive practices. The segregation of outlets was necessary, according to South
Korea, because the alternative was expensive.
The Appellate Body responded to this argument by pointing
out that the method chosen by South Korea to conserve its enforcement dollars in fact imposed costs on foreigner producers.
The segregation of sales made it more expensive for domestic sellers to sell imported goods and thus increased the cost that foreign
producers had to absorb to gain access to the market.'M As between the two methods by which South Korea could have reached
its goal-one that imposed costs on foreigners and one that absorbed the costs within the country-the Appellate Body did not
hesitate to say that it was impermissible for South Korea to give its
consumers the benefit of consumer protection while imposing the
cost of that protection on foreign producers. 139 This is an applicatection of consumer rights. Our trademark system harnesses just such a selfinterested motivation by competitors to police unlawful trademark use and other
deceptive practices in order to benefit consumers.
138This was the basis for finding that the segregation treated imported goods
"less favorably" than domestic goods. Korean-Beef, supra note 135, para. 145.
139 The Appellate Body found the following:
It is pertinent to observe that, through its dual retail system, Korea has in
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tion of the external, participatory vision of the WTO. Foreign producers did not participate in, but were adversely affected by, the
South Korean action; the WTO prohibition against discrimination
protected foreigners from paying a disproportionately high cost of
achieving a legitimate goal.
Admittedly, by striking down the South Korean regulation, the
Appellate Body increased the efficiency of the South Korean economy-a result embraced by the internal, economic vision of the
WTO. It did not, however, endorse that vision. Because the decision of the Appellate Body left South Korea free to regulate in a
way that was inefficient but did not impose disproportionate costs
on foreigners (by, for example, allowing South Korea to set up a
non-discriminatory regime that applied a local but inefficient definition of deceptive practices), the Appellate Body diverged from,
rather than endorsed, the internal, economic vision.
This is not an isolated example. 140 Whenever a country seeks to
achieve a legitimate goal, it makes choices about whether the costs
of achieving that goal should be imposed on foreigners or on those
who benefit from the goal. The WTO is often required, therefore,
to determine whether the imposition of costs on foreigners is appropriate.
As another example, in Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (from India),141 Turkey joined the customs
union formed by the European Community, a preliminary step to
joining the European Union. Incident to that affiliation, and coneffect shifted all, or the great bulk, of these potential costs of enforcement
(translated into a drastic reduction of competitive access to consumers)
to imported goods and retailers of imported goods, instead of evenly distributing such costs between domestic and imported products. In contrast, the more conventional, WTO-consistent measures of enforcement
do not involve such onerous shifting of enforcement costs which ordinarily are bome by the Member's public purse.

Id. para. 181.
140 See WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 35 I.L.M. 603 (Apr. 29,
1996) (finding that the United States imposed disproportionate burdens to comply
with the Clean Air Act on foreign refiners), availableat http://docsonline.wto.org.
Indeed, Ralph Nader has argued against NAFTA and the WTO precisely because
he wants countries to be free to impose costs on foreigners in order to reduce opposition to regulation by domestic interests and purchase their loyalty. See supra
note 49.
141 WTO Appellate Body Report on Turkey -Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/AB/R, 39 I.L.M. 159 (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Turkey Textiles], availableat http://docsonline.wto.org.
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sistent with the concept of a customs union, 142 Turkey conformed
its external regulations to those of Europe and imposed quotas on
textiles and clothing from India that were similar to a lawful European-wide quota. This disadvantaged India, whose textile and
clothing goods had not previously been subject by Turkey to a
quota.
Turkey's affiliation with the European Community was clearly
lawful; the issue was whether the imposition of the quota that conformed Turkey's policy to the European system of external restraints was a necessary by-product of that affiliation. 143 The
analysis of this problem is similar to that in the Korean Beef case.
Turkey and the European Union had a lawful goal -to make sure
that the affiliation between Europe and Turkey did not provide India with a way of circumventing Europe's lawful restrictions on
Indian textiles and clothing. But they had two means of achieving
that goal. One - the one they chose - was to restrict imports of Indian textiles and clothing into Turkey; if the goods never got into
Turkey, they could never get into Europe. The other method of
achieving their goal was to allow the Indian textiles and clothing
into Turkey but require country of origin labeling in order to make
sure that those textiles and clothing never got across the Bosphorus
and into Europe. The first method imposed costs on India, the second imposed costs on Turkey and the European Community, who
would have to police the arrangement and bear the risk that the restrictions could be circumvented.
In the face of these choices, the Appellate Body easily found
that it was impermissible for Turkey to impose the cost of meeting
the legitimate goals of the European Communities on India. With-

142Under Article XXIV 8(a)(ii) of GATT,countries forming a customs union
must ensure that "substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each member of the union to the trade of territories not included in the union." GATT Final Agreement art. XXIV, para. 8(a)(ii) (1994).
143The precise issue as formulated by the Appellate Body was whether the
"formation of the customs union [between Turkey and the European Communities] would be prevented" if it were not allowed to adopt these quantitative restrictions. Turkey Textiles, supra note 141, para. 46. According to the Appellate
Body, Turkey was not required to have exactly the same policy as the Europear,
Communities because GATT requires a common external policy only with respect
to " substantially all" the rules and regulations. Id. para. 48. This standard allowed the policies of Europe and those of Turkey to diverge somewhat. The issue
therefore became whether the restrictions on imports into Turkey were necessary
to protect the legitimate interests that the European Communities had in protecting the integrity of their lawful quota system.
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out explicitly invoking the external, participatory vision, the Appellate Body invoked the notion of less restrictive alternatives to
hold that:
Turkey could adopt rules of origin for textile and clothing
products that would allow the European Communities to
distinguish between those textile and clothing products
originating in Turkey, which would enjoy free access to the
European Communities under the terms of the customs union, and those textile and clothing products originating in
third countries, including India. 144
In essence, the Appellate Body held that the costs of achieving a
lawful goal must be internalized rather than imposed on foreigners, a conclusion that reflects the importance of an international institution that can restrain the proclivity of democratic decisionmakers to reach their internal goals by imposing costs on foreigners.
5.2. ProvidingAdequate External Process
In addition to restraining states' ability to impose disproportionate or unreasonable costs on foreigners, the WTO regime provides-through treaty provisions and treaty interpretation-a set
of procedural protections for foreigners when a state takes action
that affects their interests.145 Across a range of actions, WTO members must give participatory rights to foreign interests in good faith
before taking particular actions. This too confirms the external,
participatory vision of the WTO.
5.2.1.

ParticipatoryRights Embedded in Treaty Provisions

It is no exaggeration to say that the WTO treaties form a kind of
Administrative Procedure Act 146 for foreigners who might be adversely affected by government action. Although principles are
not of general applicability and the details vary from treaty to
144 Id. para.

62.
Petersmann, Hobbesian International Law, supra note 35, at 180 ("WTO law
and European integration law, for instance, have introduced comprehensive
guarantees of access to domestic and international adjudication with far-reaching
limitations on the right to unilateral reprisals and retortions.").
146Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
145
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treaty depending on the context, the procedural rights that are
given to foreign governments and, sometimes, foreign producers,
provide a pervasive set of procedural guarantees. 147 The treaties
guarantee foreigners access to information that is necessary for access to markets. They guarantee foreigners access to procedures by
which foreigners can influence administrative decision-making.
They guarantee access to appeals of agency action. And in the field
of intellectual property they guarantee foreigners access to effective judicial or quasi-judicial procedures through which their intellectual property rights can be enforced. The WTO treaties are, in
this respect, truly constitutional, for they extend to non-citizens
forms of due process that are generally available, under national
constitutions, only to citizens.
For example, when governments regulate product standards
and production methods they must comply with the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (the "TBT Agreement"). 148 When a
WTO member adopts a technical standard that "may have a significant effect on the trade of other Members," 149 it must publish
147 The type of process guarantees discussed in this Section-those that enable participation in administrative proceedings-are supplemented by other
process-related guarantees that are given to foreign governments and that are also
important to the effectiveness of the international trade regime. For example,
transparency guarantees allow states to monitor compliance by other countries

with the GATT obligations. See generally Bhala & Kennedy, supra note 18, 121-122

(discussing the effectiveness of transparency). In addition, the Trade Policy Review Mechanism provides a form of systematic surveillance of foreign government practices that gives other countries opportunities to observe compliance
with WTO obligations and raise questions about domestic policies that have external impacts. On the Trade Policy Review Mechanism generally, see Joseph
Francois, Trade Policy Transparency and Investor Confidence - The Implications of an
Effective Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Nov. 1999) (discussing the relationship of
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism to investor confidence in developing countries),
at
http://wwwl.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/papers_2000/francois
-tprm.pdf; Jai S. Mah, Reflections on the Trade Policy Review Mechanism in the World
Trade Organization, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 49 (1997) (discussing some procedural
problems experienced in the operation of the TPRM); Donald B.Keesing, Improving Trade Policy Reviews in the World Trade Organization(1998) (discussing the progress of Trade Policy Review Mechanism since its inception in 1989 and the challenges ahead) available at http://www.iie.com/publications/pub.cfm?pub-id=60;
Victoria Curzon-Price, GATT's New Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 14 WORLD
ECON. 227 (1991) (discussing the importance of transparency); Peter Mavroidis,
Surveillance Schemes: The GATT's New Trade Policy Review Mechanisms, 13 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 374 (1992) (analyzing the TPRM); CHAYES & CHAYES, supranote 128, at 24446 (1995) (discussing GATT in general).
148 TBT Agreement, supranote 19.
149

Id. art. 2.9.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss1/1

2003]

TWO CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS OF THE WTO

63

notice of the proposed standard, notify other members of the proposed standard and its rationale, and provide members an opportunity to comment in writing, to discuss these comments, and to
have the comments and discussions taken into account in determining the standard. 50 Further, the country undertaking the
product standards must also explain the ways in which the standard is consistent with the substantive requirements of the TBT
Agreement,' 5 ' a requirement of international justification that goes
beyond a mere participatory right. These procedural rights are
supplemented by the requirement that every WTO member comply with a Code of Good Practices for the Preparation, Adoption,
or Application of Standards in Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement,
which extends procedural rights to interested parties on a nondiscriminatory basis, thus providing procedural rights to private
businesses that might be affected by the standards. 52
Procedural rights when countries set product standards extend
beyond the process by which the standards are adopted. Transparency rules require WTO members to set up "enquiry points" to
answer questions and provide documents about the standards, a
right that is given both to governments and to interested private
parties in foreign countries. 5 3 When a member country assesses
whether imported products conform to the relevant standards,
those procedures -called conformity procedures-are subject to
rules prohibiting discrimination against foreign products and to
procedural rights for member countries and their enterprises to ensure confidentiality, a right to a reasoned analysis of conformity,
and an opportunity to comment on the conformity procedures that

150 Id. These procedural protections are given to members only when the national standard deviates from a relevant international standard. This is not, however, a significant exception to participatory rights since it is contemplated and
required that "[m]embers shall play a full part, within the limits of their resources,
in the preparation by appropriate international standardizing bodies of international standards...." Id. art. 2.6. The obligation to give participatory rights to
foreign governments in standard-setting exercises is also qualified by the right of
members to omit those procedural rights where "urgent problems of safety,
health, environmental protection or national security arise or threaten to arise," in
which event the procedural rights must be given after the standard is adopted. Id.

art. 2.10.
151 Id. art. 2.5.
152 Id. art 4.1. Under this provision, each member must also take reasonable

measures to make sure that its local governments and non-government standardizing bodies also comply with the Code.
153 Id. art. 10.
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are adopted.'54 This comprehensive code of administrative procedure governing all standards-making is an application of the external, participatory vision.
This pattern of procedural requirements is a common feature of
many WTO treaties. 55 Moreover, in WTO adjudication, the Appel-

154

Id. art. 5.

155 WTO members must guarantee similar procedural requirements when they

take action to block imports. When applying safeguards, for example, which allow a

member to take action to retard imports when increasing imports are causing or
threatening to cause serious injury, members must not only act in accordance with
fully transparent procedures, under GATT article X, but must also give "reasonable
public notice" and a means by which importers, exporters and other interested parties can present evidence and their views and confront the views of others. Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 19, art. 3. The member administrative authority must
issue a report of "findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues
of fact and law." Id. When applying its antidumping law, each member must give
all interested parties, which includes foreign producers, exporters, and their government, a copy of the "application" by the domestic industry alleging the unlawful dumping and a "full opportunity for the defense of their interests." Antidumping Agreement, supra note 20, art. 6. Further, Article 12 provides detailed
rules on the nature of the public notice that must be given at various stages of the
process. Investigations in the country from which the allegedly dumped goods
come are subject to strict procedural controls. Id. art. 6.7 and Annex I. See WTO
Appellate Body Report on Thailand -Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes,
and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland,
WT/DS122/AB/R, para. 110 (Mar. 12, 2001) (stating that Article 12 sets forth important procedural and due process obligations). Determinations made by administrative authorities must be subjected to review in an independent forum.
Antidumping Agreement, supra note 19, art. 13. Some of these procedural protections were interpreted in WTO Panel Report on Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, WT/DS132/R
Uan. 28, 2000) (finding that Mexico violated procedures for applying provisional
measures but not procedures for initiating and conducting an antidumping case)
available at http://docsonline.wto.org. Similar procedural protections attend the
imposition of countervailing duties by member countries. See SCM Agreement, supra
note 19, art. 11 (discussing the initiation of investigation only with sufficient evidence); id. art. 12 (discussing the right of both interested members and interested parties to give evidence and to be informed of essential facts under consideration before
making a final determination); id. art. 22 (discussing the right to notice at various
stages of the proceeding and to reasoned determinations); id. art. 23 (detailing the
right to review in an independent forum). Article X of the GATT Final Agreement
also provides procedural protections. Specifically, it requires that a Member, in
making effective a measure of general application, must publish such measures
"promptly in such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them. ... " GATT art. X:I. Article X:3(a) requires that members
"administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulation, decisions and rulings .... " GATT Final Agreement art. X:3(a) (1999). Article
X:3 of the GATT 1994 establishes certain minimum standards for transparency
and procedural fairness in the administration of trade regulations. In other areas,
the attention that the WTO treaties give to transparency provides important protec-
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late Body has, in the spirit of the external, participatory vision, interpreted the procedural requirements broadly to make sure that
the procedural rights given in the treaties are effectively implemented.156
The most far-reaching guarantee of foreigners' rights goes beyond even the right to participate in administrative proceedings
and gives foreigners the right to enforce their rights in a neutral
quasi-judicial forum. The treaty dealing with intellectual property,
TRIPS,157 requires every WTO member (subject to a transition period for least developed countries) to have available an enforcement system in which intellectual property owners can enforce
their property rights against alleged infringersls 8 In the United

States, where access to courts to vindicate rights is second nature
and is available to all, it is often overlooked that access to an independent adjudicatory system is, in many countries, a novelty, and
that an enforceable right of foreigners to sue to protect their rights
within that territory is of enormous importance in knitting together

tions for foreigners. See, e.g., TRIMS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 6 (discussing
transparency).
156 See, e.g., WTO Appellate Body Report on United States -Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from
Korea, WT/DS202/AB/R (Feb. 15, 2002) (finding that a duty to consult under Article 12.3 of the Agreement on Safeguards before taking safeguard actions requires
meaningful exchange, including duty to discuss remedy actually adopted), available at http://docsonline.wto.org; WTO Appellate Body Report on United
States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the
European Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R (Dec. 22, 2000) (holding that sufficiently detailed information is required to fulfill the obligation to provide an adequate opportunity for consultations), available at http://docsonline.wto.org; WTO
Appellate Body Report on Korea -Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of
Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R (Dec. 14 1999) (interpreting "all pertinent information" in Article 12.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards broadly, so
members with a substantial interest in the product subject to a safeguard measure
can engage in meaningful consultations under Article 12.3), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org.
157 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 19.
15

Article 41 requires countries to "ensure that enforcement procedures ...

are available ... so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement
.... " TRIPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 41, para. 1. Although that does not re-

quire "a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct
from that for the enforcement of law in general," the numerous obligations in this
and succeeding articles of TRIPS require an independent decision-maker who
takes evidence on the record and has enforcement and sanctioning power against
alleged infringers. Id. art. 41, para. 5. Article 42 requires that members "make
available to rights holders civil judicial procedures concerning the enforcement of
intellectual property .. " Id. art. 42 (footnote omitted).
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disparate national systems and fulfilling the external, participatory
vision.
5.2.2.

ProceduralGuaranteesas a General Requirementfor
Avoiding Unjustifiable or Arbitrary Discrimination

The protection of the participatory rights of foreigners is not
limited to rights enumerated in the WTO agreements; participatory
rights are deeply ingrained in the ethos of WTO norms and jurisprudence. Even beyond the provisions of WTO agreements that
give foreigners specific procedural rights to participate meaningfully in a country's policymaking machinery, the Appellate Body
has interpreted the general non-discriminatory standards of the
WTO treaties to require procedural attention to the views of foreign governments and, through them, to the views of foreign private interests.
Most notably, in the landmark Shrimp Turtles 59 decision, the
Appellate Body made the procedural rights of foreigners the
touchstone for the application of the general exceptions of Article
XX of GATT.160 There, the Appellate Body considered the legality
of United States restrictions on the importation of shrimp from
countries that were not adequately regulating their shrimp fishermen in a way that protected endangered sea turtles. Under the
terms of the chapeau to Article XX, the United States could not
maintain these restrictions if they constituted "a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade." 16' The Appellate Body made the procedural rights of foreigners the centerpiece of its analysis of that language. According
to the Appellate Body:

159 WTO Appellate Body Report on United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), 38 I.L.M. 12
(1999), availableat http://docsonline.wto.org [hereinafter Shrimp Turtles].
160See Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A
New Legal Baselinefor the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 CoLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 491,
505 (2002) ("[Tihe chapeau's safeguards limit the damage that unilateralism can
do to nondiscriminatory, rule-based trade.").
161Shrimp Turtles, supra note 159, at 15 (quoting the joint appellees' request
that the Appellate Body rule the embargo on shrimp to be inconsistent with the
chapeau of Article XX).
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Another aspect of the application of [the U.S. regulatory
scheme] that bears heavily in any appraisal of justifiable or
unjustifiable discrimination is the failure of the United
States to engage [foreign-exporting countries] in serious,
across-the-board negotiations with the objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection
and conservation of sea turtles, before enforcing the import
prohibition. 62
This holding is noteworthy for two reasons. Although the Ap-

pellate Body did not support its interpretation of Article XX with
citations to general principles of international law, it could have,
for customary international law often calls for negotiations when
domestic policy has external environmental effects. 163 Moreover,
the Appellate Body embraced this broad participatory principle

even though it could have ruled on the narrower ground that the
United States had discriminated by negotiating with some but not
all of its trading partners. 164 Although the failure to negotiate was
Id. at 65.
160See Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 12 R. I.A.A. 218 (1956), 24 I.L.R.
162

101 (Arbitral Trib. Nov. 16, 1957) (holding that France has an obligation to confer
with Spain before planning a hydroelectric project in the Pyrenees that could adversely affect Spain); Case Concerning the Gabikovo-Nagymoros Project (Hung.
v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 65, 78 (Sept. 25, 1997) (basing duty to negotiate in part on
prior agreement between the parties, but citing precedent for customary duty to
negotiate, including "North Sea Continental Shelf" Case, I.C.J. Reports 1969, para.
85, 93). Of course, treaties often impose a duty of prior consultation and negotiation when transborder policy is made. See, e.g., United Nations: Convention on
the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 36 I.L.M.
700 (1997).
164 The U.S. State Department, which enforced the shrimp embargo, at first
interpreted its Congressional mandate to cover only the Western Hemisphere and
negotiated the Inter-American Convention for the Protection of Sea Turtles with
its trading partners in that area of the world. When the U.S. Court of International Trade interpreted the Congressional mandate to include endangered turtles
anywhere in the world and fixed an early date for compliance with the mandate,
the State Department threw together an embargo program without giving the
countries of Southeast Asia the same pocedural rights given to countries in the
Western Hemisphere. This unintentional discriminatory treatment became an alternative holding for the Appellate Body. See Shrimp Turtles, supra note 159, para.
172. Robert Howse has mounted a strenuous argument against this reading of the
Shrimp opinion, arguing that the Appellate Body did not articulate a general duty
to negotiate, but only a duty to negotiate on a non-discriminatory basis when a
state negotiates with at least one country. Howse, supra note 160, at 507-10. His
argument, while plausible, has the appearance of wishful thinking from an environmental champion. Admittedly, the Appellate Body was less than clear, but the
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only one of the grounds for striking down the application of the
United States measure, the obligation to negotiate before taking
disunilateral measures in order to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable
165
norms.
WTO
evolving
in
rooted
firmly
crimination is thus

significant fact is that the Appellate Body announced the general duty to negotiate
before it talked about the duty not to discriminate against countries when negotiating, which seems to indicate that the general duty to negotiate is independent of
the secondary duty not to discriminate while negotiating. Moreover, the Appellate Body recognized that the subject matter being regulated, the "protection and
conservation of highly migratory species of sea turtles 'itself' demands concerted
and cooperative efforts on the part of the many countries whose waters are traversed in the course of the recurrent sea turtle migrations." Shrimp Turtles, supra
note 159, para. 168. This, too, supports the need for cooperative, not unilateral,
action, the very foundation of the external, participatory vision. See also Gr~inne
de Bdirca & Joanne Scott, The Impact of the WTO on EU Decision-Making,in THE EU
AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 1, 16-22 (Grdinne de B(irca &
Joanne Scott eds., 2001); Howard F. Chang, Toward a Greener GATT: Environmental
Trade Measures and the Shrimp-Turtle Case, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 31 (2000) (offering
support for cooperative action); Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade and Environment After
the Shrimp-Turtles Litigation, 34 J. WORLD TRADE 73 (2000). Moreover, the later
opinion of the Appellate Body in the same case that reviewed the duty to negotiate in a challenge brought by Malaysia did not back away from the general duty
to negotiate. Naturally, when testing whether a country has negotiated in good
faith-the requirement imposed by the Appellate Body-the good faith can be
measured by comparing how the country negotiated with its various trading
partners, which is what the Appellate Body held. WTO Appellate Body Report on
United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the OSU by Malaysia [hereinafter Shrimp Turtles (21.5)],
WT/DS58/AB/RW, 41 I.L.M. 149, para. 122 (Oct. 22, 2001), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org. But that opinion also pointed out that the holding
that a state may not negotiate discriminatorily was only "in part" the basis of the
ruling that the United States has engaged in unjustifiable discrimination. Id. para.
119. The other part of the holding, presumably, was the general duty to negotiate,
which is implicitly endorsed by the reference to discriminatory negotiations as
only a "part" of the original opinion. Moreover, the Appellate Body repeated that
in view of the requirement in the United States legislation to negotiate and:
given the decided preference for multilateral approaches voiced by WTO
Members and others in the international community in various international agreements for the protection and conservation of endangered sea
turtles that were cited in our previous Report, the United States, in our
view, would be expected to make good faith efforts to reach international
agreements that are comparable from one forum of negotiation to the
other.
Id. para. 122.
165 The obligation to negotiate was further discussed and amplified when the
Appellate Body reviewed later United States' efforts to negotiate with foreign
countries. See Shrimp-Turtles (21.5), supra note 164 (upholding the United States
actions as complying with the good faith standard).
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Moreover, the procedural requirements of the Shrimp Turtles
decision went beyond the general requirement to negotiate in good
faith before imposing environmental embargoes. The Appellate
Body found in the concept of "arbitrary discrimination" a requirement of transparent and predictable processes. 166 Thus, when a
country sets up a process for certifying countries that meet environmental standards it must provide the applicant country with an
opportunity to be heard, to respond to the arguments made against
it, and to receive a statement of reasons for the denial of the certificate. 167 Again, the importance of the WTO as an international organization to enforce participatory rights is apparent. 68 In short,
166 "Article X:3 of the GATT Final Agreement establishes certain minimum
standards for transparency and procedural fairness in the administration of trade
regulations ...... "Shrimp Turtles, supranote 159, para. 183.
Inasmuch as there are due process requirements generally for measures
that are otherwise imposed in compliance with WTO obligations, it is
only reasonable that rigorous compliance with the fundamental requirements of due process should be required in the application and
administration of a measure which purports to be an exception to the
treaty obligations of the Member imposing the measure and which effectively results in a suspension pro hac vice of the treaty rights of other
Members.
Id. para. 182 (discussing Article X:3). In addition:
The non-transparent and ex parte nature of the internal governmental
procedures applied by the... [United States] ... throughout the certification processes under Section 609, as well as the fact that countries
whose applications are denied do not receive formal notice of such denial, nor of the reasons for the denial, and the fact, too, that there is no
formal legal procedure for review of, or appeal from, a denial of an application, are all contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of Article X:3 of
the GATF 1994.
Id. para. 183. Apparently this finding supported the conclusion of arbitrary discrimination under the chapeau of art. XX. See id. para. 184 ("We find... that the
United States measure ... amounts to.. . 'arbitrary discrimination' ... ").
167 Interestingly, this requirement comes because of the inherent discrimination between those who are certified (even if no procedural rights are granted)
and those who are denied an effective procedural opportunity to be certified. See
Shrimp Turtles, supra note 159, para. 181 (demonstrating the impossibility of fair
administration with different procedural rules).
168 The rights of participation that the Shrimp-Turtle (21.5) decision requires
are an important part of the detente that the Appellate Body forged in that decision between the trade regime and the environmental regime. The Appellate
Body was struggling with the claims of the trade regime-which wanted to restrict embargoes intended to protect the environment outside of a country-and
the environmental regime-which wanted to enable countries to make trade
rights dependent on countries meeting environmental standards. The Appellate
Body forged a compromise by allowing trade to be enlisted to enforce extra-
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the external, participatory model of the WTO is deeply embedded
in the jurisprudence of the WTO.
6. THE INTERNAL, ECONOMIC VISION WEAKENS SUPPORT FOR THE
WTO; THE EXTERNAL, PARTICIPATORY VISION ENHANCES IT
Not only is the internal, economic vision of WTO legitimacy
founded on inaccurate constitutional analysis and misplaced notions of democratic policymaking, the vision cannot sustain support for the WTO among a broad range of civil society. The internal, economic vision emphasizes the economic benefits of trade,
and the values promoted by efficiency, a view tailor-made for (and
by) economists and trade specialists. 169 But it does not advance a
vision for the WTO that is acceptable to those for whom economic
and efficiency values are not paramount.17 0 The vision presents too
narrow a focus - and an unnecessarily narrow focus - to garner

widespread support for the legitimacy of the WTO.
The problem with the internal, economic vision is not with
faulty economic analysis. The economic case for free trade is clear.
The problem with the internal, economic vision is that for many
people, the economic or efficiency values on which the vision is
based are only a subset of the values that make social arrangements valuable. For a good part of the non-trade community social
policy must be based on a wider array of values, including measterritorial environmental standards, but only after full, meaningful, and nondiscriminatory participation by all countries involved. The United States was
found to have complied with that requirement in Shrimp Turtles (21.5), supranote
164, para. 134.
169 Robert Howse makes a similar point when he writes:
As persons with the bent of managers and technical specialists, they
tended to understand the trade system in terms of the policy science of
economics, not a grand normative political vision. A sense of pride developed that an international regime was being evolved that stood
above the "madhouse" of politics (if one can borrow Pascal's image), a
regime grounded in the insights of economic "science," and not vulnerable to the open-ended normative controversies and conflicts that
plagued most international institutions and regimes, most notably, for
instance, the United Nations.
Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy-and Back Again: The Fate of the MultilateralTrading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 94,98 (2002).
170 See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 12, at 403 ("1 can only imagine what Seattle
would have been like if [McGinnis'] ideas had been widely circulated among protestors.") (referring to the version of the internal, economic vision appearing in
John 0. McGinnis, The Political Economy of Global Multilateralism,1 CHI. J. INT'L L.
381 (2000).
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ures of welfare that are not precisely captured by arguments about
efficient markets. To them, enhancing efficiency without also paying attention to values of equity and community is a mistake.
Indeed, the internal, economic vision confirms the worst fears
that members of civil society have about the WTO and the world
trading system. That vision espouses the very caricature of the
WTO that the WTO critics find so objectionable -the idea that the
function of the WTO is to freeze public policy into efficiency values, and to retard public policy that would be based on nonefficiency values. In addition, because what is frozen in place is a
view of efficiency made by trade specialists at a time when the relationships between free trade values and other social values were
only dimly understood, the vision gives rise to the justifiable fear
that a particularly narrow brand of efficiency analysis is being
"constitutionalized" through the WTO. The defenders of the WTO
who espouse this vision are challenging the WTO's critics to accept
the free trade paradigm; that will not happen. They should be
working to fit the free trade paradigm into a broader vision of the
role of democratic values in making economic and social policy in
an era of interconnected globalization.
The irony is that the external, participatory vision of the WTO
is fully consistent with the efficiency values that are so important
to trade specialists and economists. The external, participatory vision emphasizes the freedom given by markets and the importance
of transnational legal participation as a mechanism to enhance that
freedom. It fully supports the goals of those who would build
wealth by building freedom, but without pushing a model of unilateral tariff reduction that history and experience have shown to
be unrealistic.
Not only is the external, participatory vision of the WTO fully
consistent with values of efficiency, it is attractive for other reasons. Because the vision is grounded in fundamental and widely
shared values associated with democracy, federalism, and constitutionalism, and because it accurately encompasses the values that
actually animate the WTO system, the external, participatory vision is - for those reasons - attractive to the WTO's critics and to a
wide spectrum of civil society. The heart of the external, participatory vision is the need to foster participatory decision-making
when decisions in one country potentially affect people who live in
other countries. This value underlies the international agenda of
virtually every group that might otherwise be a critic of the WTO.
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To see why the external, participatory vision is attractive, consider the following passage in which David Held discusses the essential democratic dilemma in an interconnected world:
To take some topical examples: a decision to increase interest rates in an attempt to stem inflation or exchange rate instability is most often taken as a 'national' decision, although it may well stimulate economic changes in other
countries. A decision to permit the 'harvesting' of the rainforests may contribute to ecological damage far beyond the
borders, which formally limits the responsibility of a formal
set of political decision-makers. A decision to build a nuclear power plant near the frontiers of a neighboring country is a decision likely to be taken without consulting those
in the nearby country (or countries), despite the many risks
and ramifications for them. A decision by a government to
save resources by suspending food aid to a nation may
stimulate the sudden escalation of food prices in that nation
and contribute directly to an outbreak of famine among the
urban and rural poor. These decisions, along with policies
on issues as diverse as investment, arms procurement and
AIDS, are typically regarded as falling within the typical
domain of authority of a sovereign nation-state. Yet, in a
world of regional and global interconnectedness, there are
major questions to be put about the coherence, viability,
and accountability of national decision-making entities
themselves.171
Held's analysis makes it clear that a democratic deficit similar
to that addressed by the WTO cuts across subject matter. Policy
that adversely affects the welfare of those living in other countries
is a common feature of the modem world. Accordingly, we need
to find institutional structures to enhance democracy by giving
those adversely affected by policy the opportunity to play a role in
shaping that policy, not only for economic policy issues (like interest rate levels), but in every other social issue in which one country, through its policy decisions, has the power to affect the lives of
people in other countries.
171 DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER, supranote 16, at 16.
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In short, the external, participatory vision of the WTO places
the WTO firmly in the forefront of international institutions that
are addressing the central issue of global governance -how policy
that affects the lives of foreigners is made when those foreigners
have no formal voice in shaping that policy. This is an issue that is
at the core of the interest of groups of various political persuasions,
across numerous subject matter areas. 172 Environmentalists, labor
rights activists, and human rights activists, on the one hand, and
those interested in transnational issues or economic freedom, on
the other, are at the most fundamental level concerned with the effects of policy made in one country or the people of other countries, and are therefore interested in advancing new forms of transnational policymaking. Once they understand the true nature of
the WTO, they will stop questioning the legitimacy of the WTO
and begin the earnest task of integrating the values of the WTO
with other values that are important to people.

7.

CONCLUSION

The WTO needs to be rescued from its friends. The WTO is
one of the most important international institutions, but not for the
reasons that trade specialists and economists believe, and not for
the reasons that global skeptics fear. True, the WTO has had significant success as a trade organization and has been instrumental
in improving the welfare of many people around the world in all
types of countries. But the legitimacy and importance of the WTO
lies not in its role in opening markets or in helping countries suppress "special interest" legislation. Its importance lies in the success that it has had in moving globalization toward new forms of
transnational participation and thus new forms of global democracy.
The friends of the WTO-those trade enthusiasts and economists that have guided the fortunes of the WTO-have put together a defense of the WTO that accentuates the efficiency values
that the WTO promotes and the welfare that is promoted by efficiency values. I do not doubt those values or question the welfare
effectiveness of the WTO. But efficiency is not the only value that
172 The external, participatory vision will therefore be attractive to advocates
of Immanuel Kant's notion of cosmopolitan democracy that can lead to perpetual
peace. See, e.g., PERPETUAL PEACE Games Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bachmann eds.,
1997) (discussing, through different pieces, Kant's cosmopolitan ideal of perpetual
peace).
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drives public policy, and the critics of the WTO are justified in
questioning the legitimacy of any organization that emphasizes efficiency values at the expense of other values. As long as the legitimacy of the WTO is understood and projected in terms of efficiency values, and as long as the WTO is understood only as a
trade organization, the WTO will fail to receive the respect that it
deserves and the acceptance that will enable it to play a more central role in providing public policy solutions to the challenges of
globalization.
As we have seen, democracy is a difficult concept to advance in
an era of globalization. In an interconnected world, the concept of
territorial democracy is an historical artifact rather a workable program. Democracy assumes that those who will be affected by policy will have an opportunity to participate in some form in the
making of that policy. Because that is not possible when the policy
made in one country adversely affects people in other countries,
much contemporary policymaking violates fundamental notions of
democracy. State-centered democracy in an interconnected world
has only the patina of legitimacy rather than the content of legitimacy. As long as the policies made in one country affect the welfare of people in other countries, support for individual autonomy
and self-determination- the essence of democracy -compels us to

search for new forms of representation across borders. The WTO is
one such form of transnational representation and participation.
The WTO allows each member country, in the representation of
its people, to try to persuade other countries to change policies that
are inimical to the interests of its people when those people would
otherwise be adversely affected by the policy without representation. A country proposing to increase a tariff or subsidy, or to
regulate its affairs in a way that reduces access to its market unnecessarily, must appear in a forum that allows those adversely affected by the policy to argue against the policy. Because this forum
fosters participatory policymaking, it is consistent with, and reinforces, global federalism that increases, rather than decreases
global democracy and effective national sovereignty.
The WTO supports important participatory and democratic
principles in an era of globalization; this role is one that even the
critics of particular policies of the WTO must acknowledge to be
legitimate. This role is precisely the role that the critics of the WTO
find to be necessary to deal with other areas in which policy made
in one nation adversely affects people in other nations -issues of
environmental spillover and international crime for example. Ac-
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cordingly, critics and friends alike can appreciate the WTO as an
institution of participatory policymaking.
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